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Abstract
This paper is the first part of a wide-ranging study of the role of intellectual property in the
software industry. Unlike previous papers, which focus primarily on software patents – which generally
are held by firms that are not software firms – this paper provides a thorough and contextually grounded
description of the role that patents actually play in the software industry itself.
The bulk of the paper considers the pros and cons of patents in the software industry. On the
positive side, the paper starts by emphasizing the difficulties that pre-revenue startups face in obtaining
any value from patents. Litigation to enforce patents is impractical for those firms. Efforts to obtain
patents divert the firm’s focus from the central task of designing and deploying a product, and the benefits
of excluding competitors are limited for firms that cannot themselves exploit the relevant technology.
Once the firm is larger, a number of potential benefits appear. First, despite concerns that patents are not
effective to appropriate innovation in the software industry, a substantial number of software startups do
have patents of sufficient strength to exclude competitors. Because the principal targets of those patents
are much larger firms, that finding is important because it suggests that patents are more beneficial to
small firms than to large firms. The paper then considers indirect effects related to the use of patents in
cross-licensing transactions and in providing information about the firm. The first benefit may be
substantial to firms that obtain patents, but the paper dismisses use in cross licensing as a net benefit to
the industry: absent some other benefit, all firms would be better off saving the costs of obtaining patents.
The information benefits, in contrast, seem to be net improvements in the system of innovation. The
question, however, is whether those benefits are sufficiently substantial to justify the costs of obtaining
the patents.
The paper then turns to the prominent claims advanced by Larry Lessig, Jim Bessen, and others
that the enforcement of software patents has hindered innovation in the software industry through creation
of a patent “thicket.” The paper rejects those claims for two broad reasons. First, notwithstanding the
empirical analysis of R&D spending in papers by Bessen, Maskin, and Hunt, I argue that direct evidence
of high R&D spending in the software industry undermines claims that software patents cause firms to
reduce R&D spending. Second, I argue that the actual structure and practices of the industry belie any
claim of a patent thicket. Relying on interviews that I conducted and publicly available information, I
show that young firms in the software industry are not in any significant way constrained in their
development activities by the existence of large patent portfolios in the hands of incumbent firms.
The paper also contextualizes the role of patents by examining the relatively weak protections
that copyright and trade secret can afford. At bottom, neither of those systems can provide a useful
mechanism that would allow small firms to appropriate the values of their inventions. If such protection
is a significant positive benefit of the patent system, it is equally true that neither copyrights nor trade
secrets are (or can) contribute significantly in that respect, however useful they might be in other roles
(such as preventing piracy).
The paper closes by considering critically the possibility of middle-ground responses that would
limit patent rights in the industry but not abolish them entirely. First, I criticize a possible registration
system that might provide the information benefits discussed in Part III without the costs of excluding
competitors. I argue that such an approach would be impractical both because it would be difficult to
disentangle the information benefits from the right to control technology, and because of my sense that
software firms would have an inadequate incentive to participate in such a system. Finally, I consider the
possibility of special limits on the rights of “trolls,” small non-operating firms formed solely to litigate
patents. I argue that trolls serve a useful function as specialized intermediaries and that in fact they may
have a positive role in promoting innovation in the industry.
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DO PATENTS FACILITATE FINANCING
IN THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY?
I. Introduction
The U.S. software industry is characterized by astonishing levels of growth, innovative
activity and competition. Some argue that innovation in the software and related industries has
driven much of the innovation in other industries in recent decades.1 Federal government
statistics suggest it is one of the few information technology sectors that consistently showsa
large trade surplus,2 and as the pressures of globalization dilute the comparative advantage of
American employees in many sectors, it is worth noting the remarkable level of employment
growth over the last decade, from 854,000 jobs in 1992 to more than 2.1 million jobs in 2000 (a
12 percent annual growth rate).3
Academics, however, generally see a different picture. They see an industry burdened by
an intellectual property (IP) system that grants so many software patents4 that small companies
cannot effectively innovate.5 That perspective interested me for several reasons. First, unless it
is merely a broader attack on the entire IP system,6 it assumes that innovation in software is so
different from innovation in other areas that traditional IP protections are inappropriate. It also
jarred with my general skepticism about the deterministic effect of legal institutions. My

1

MOWERY & NELSON 1999.

2

See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
ADMINISTRATION, DIGITAL ECONOMY 2002, p. 53 (noting trade surpluses in the software industry of
more than $2.5 billion a year during the late 1990’s).
3

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION,
DIGITAL ECONOMY 2002, p. 43. During that period, the wages earned by employees grew at an average
annual rate of 7.8 percent, for an average wage in 2000 of $80,900, the highest in any of the information
technology-producing industries
4

As I explain below (text accompanying note 8), it is difficult to get precise numbers. It is clear,
however, that the PTO is granting far more than 10,000 software patents each year. Allison & Lemley
2000 finds 18,000 software patents during a two-year period from 1996-1998. Their number is
extrapolated from a sample of all patents issued during a two-year period, using a methodology that treats
a patent as a software patent only if it is “completely embodied” in software. Allison & Lemley
2000:2110, 2115. Greg Aharonian’s somewhat broader measure (which appears to include any patent
that includes an element of software) estimates 13,000, 17,500, and 22,500 in 1997, 1998, and 1999
respectively.
5

See LESSIG 2001:205-15; Bessen & Maskin 2002; Bessen 2003; Shapiro 2001; FTC
REPORT:52-53 (reporting testimony at FTC hearings on the role of patents in the software industry).
6

John Barton has a broader criticism. He argues that the growth of IP lawyers at a faster pace
than R&D spending shows a serious problem in the design of our patent system. Barton 2000; see also
Kash & Kingston 2001 (arguing that patents do not work in complex industries because they are used as
bargaining chips). Doubts about whether the patent system as a whole causes an increase in innovation
are not new. See Plant 1934:33-37.
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intuition was to doubt that legal rules granting patent protection could have a sufficiently
substantial effect to alter the course of innovation in either direction.
The existing literature on the subject7 focuses on the nature and effects of software
patents. That is to say, most writers have proceeded by identifying patents that fall within the
PTO or IPC classes that correspond most closely to software innovation and then examining data
about the performance and behavior of the firms that hold those patents. That approach –
although useful in examining the nature of software patents and the work of the PTO – has two
major disadvantages for the broader agenda of evaluating the effects of software patents. First,
the quality of the research depends entirely on the propriety of the definition of a “software”
patent. Because software is a recently devised technology, however, it does not fall naturally
within any particular class or classes. Thus, any definition that relies on patent classes is to some
degree arbitrary.8 Moreover, large manufacturing firms (Ford, GM, etc.) outside the software
industry hold the overwhelming majority of the patents that those papers analyze. Thus, it is
unclear whether the empirical results reflect the effects of the software patents or whether similar
results would be obtained for firms that receive substantial revenues from the sale of software
products or services.
This paper rejects that approach, opting instead to analyze innovation in the software
industry itself.9 My approach is to identify firms that develop software and then to study the
effects of IP on the behavior of those firms. Thus, I focus on firms like IBM, Microsoft, and
their smaller competitors that often are ignored in the existing research. Another aspect of my
project is that it examines the smaller firms in the industry, rather than looking exclusively at
large publicly traded companies.10 Given the importance of small companies to software
innovation (a major theme of this paper), that extension is also a substantial advance.
My methodology is empirical and analytical. I rely here on a set of about 60 interviews11
with a variety12 of professionals knowledgeable about the software industry: software
7

Although Lessig publicizes the issue, he does not present any new data. His contribution is to
provide a perspective on the implications of the existing literature. LESSIG 2001. The most important
empirical contributions to the debate are Graham & Mowery 2002 and a series of unpublished papers by
James Bessen and his co-authors: Bessen & Maskin 2002, Bessen 2003, Bessen & Hunt 2003. The
description in the text refers to those papers collectively.
8

See Allison & Lemley 2000:2115 & n.51: Bessen & Hunt 2003:8-9.

9

In this respect, my work is parallel to the work of Hall & Ziedonis on the semi-conductor
industry. Hall & Ziedonis 2001.
10

Graham & Mowery 2002 also analyzes patents in the software industry. That paper makes
many contributions, but it necessarily focuses on publicly traded firms for which quantitative data is
readily available. Another useful analysis of the role of innovation in the industry is Merges 1996a,
which compares innovation in the United States and Japan. However, that paper was written before the
rise in patenting that has sparked the present debate.
11

A methodological appendix summarizes the protocols that governed the interviews.

12

I spoke to twenty executives at startup firms, thirteen investors, thirteen executives at large
firms, six executives at banks, and six lawyers.

2

3

Software Patents

July 27, 2004 Draft

developers, venture capitalists, angel investors, banks that lend to software startups, large
software and hardware firms, and knowledgeable attorneys. Those interviews are designed to
provide qualitative information about the motivations and practices that form the institutional
environment within which software firms operate.
Analytically, I connect the interviews to several well-developed literatures relevant to the
questions that the project raises. Initially, I account for a substantial body of doctrinal
scholarship examining the question of how to accommodate existing bodies of IP law to the
nature of innovation in the software industry.13 Because my goal is to understand the relation
between IP and innovation, I also must engage a rich and varied economic analysis of
innovation. That literature includes formal and informal analyses of how best to allocate the
profits of ideas between the various actors in a sequential scheme of innovation,14 historical
analyses about the effects patents have had over time,15 and empirical analyses (primarily
questionnaires) regarding the value of patents in appropriating the profits of innovation in
various industries.16 Finally, because I am interested in the ability of patents to facilitate
financing of software firms, I examine empirical studies of entrepreneurial innovation, which
consider the nature and effects of venture capital investing.17
It should be clear that any effort to examine the relation between patents and innovation
must proceed with modest goals. It is not plausible to think that researchers could obtain the
evidence necessary to determine whether patents cause innovation in the industry to proceed
with an optimal rate in optimal directions.18 Thus, my work here is consciously imprecise. My
goal is to provide a richer understanding of the possible effects that patents have in the industry.
Using this methodology, I can only exclude explanations that are inconsistent with events “on
the ground.” I cannot hope to provide a comprehensive or definitive account of the effects of
patents on innovation. With that in mind, I set the stage in Part II with an overview of the
structure of the software industry and the debate about patenting in that industry. I follow with
13

Mark Lemley has argued that several characteristics of the industry justify giving software
patents a narrow scope. Burk & Lemley 2003:82-90; Cohen & Lemley 2001. More broadly, the early
work of Samuelson, Davis, Kapor & Reichman 1994; see Samuelson 1990, advocates a sui generic
scheme designed especially for the industry. At this time, such a scheme probably would conflict with
our obligations under TRIPS. See Burk & Lemley 2003:110-11.
14

The work of Suzanne Scotchmer is impressive. See Scotchmer 1991; Green & Scotchmer
1995; Samuelson & Scotchmer 2002. For a useful survey of the literature, see Mazzoleni & Nelson 1998.
15

Merges & Nelson 1990; Merges & Nelson 1994; Moser 2003. Merges also has written about
the likelihood that businesses will develop private institutions for disseminating technology. Merges
1996; Merges 2001; Merges 2004.
16

Levin, Klevorick, Nelson & Winter 1987; Cohen, Nelson & Walsh 2000.

17

See, e.g., GOMPERS & LERNER 2000; GOMPERS & LERNER 2001.

18

Most modern studies assume that increases in innovation are uniformly good and thus do not
consider the possibility that the patent system might cause excessive innovation. E.g., Merges & Nelson
1990:878 (recognizing the problem, but explicitly assuming that more innovation is better). The classic
counterexample is Barzel (1968) (formal analysis of the possibility that patents will cause innovation that
is greater or earlier than optimal).
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three substantive Parts that discuss in turn the potential benefits of patents in the industry, the
potential costs of patents in the industry, and the role of copyright, trade secret, and other
alternative schemes that a firm might use to protect its software-related innovations. I close with
a brief discussion of problems with possible alternative systems for protecting innovation in the
industry.
II. The Software Industry
It is important to begin with an understanding of the structure of the industry. The
industry is young. It generally is regarded as originating in the mid-1960’s.19 The concept of the
software product – designed by one firm and sold to a second firm for use on that firm’s
computer – first originated because of the increasing complexity of software20 and the shortage
of the labor needed for each firm to make its own software.21 The most crucial event was the
decision of IBM in late 1968 to “unbundle” its software from its hardware.22 Sales of software
products grew rapidly throughout the 1970’s. By the 1980’s, the United States had a large and
well-developed corporate software products industry, with more than 1800 firms.23
The industry was not, however, fated to retain the unitary status that it had when it first
evolved out of the IBM-dominated days of the 1960’s. On the contrary, the last quarter-century
has seen a succession of events that have repeatedly restructured the industry. The number of
developments makes any list of key events arbitrary, but for my purposes, the first salient
landmark in the fractionation of the industry was the introduction of the personal computer in the
mid-1970’s. That development rapidly led to a largely separate set of companies producing
software for personal computers.24 The popularization of the graphical user interface in the early
1990’s brought with it an increasingly large role for Microsoft, but to this day dozens of
competitors continue to provide significant products for those machines.25 Yet another sector of
the industry that arose by that time is the massive sector producing games and other
entertainment software.26 Finally, the rise of the Internet has brought first a tremendous influx of

19

See CAMPBELL-KELLY 2003:89-119.

20

Observers at the time – including IBM management – were profoundly shocked when it took
5,000 man-years for IBM to develop its OS/360 program. CAMPBELL-KELLY 2003:95.
21

The shortage was driven in part by the rapid deployment of general-purpose computers: the
number in the U.S. grew from 4,400 in 1960 to 48,500 in 1970. CAMPBELL-KELLY 2003:90; RUTTAN
2001:338.
22

Although IBM has more complicated explanations for the decision to unbundle, external
observers attribute the decision to pressures from antitrust litigation. See CAMPBELL-KELLY 2003: 10910.
23

See CAMPBELL-KELLY 2003:121-73.

24

See CAMPBELL-KELLY 2003:201-28; RUTTAN 2001:338-39; Graham & Mowery 2002:3-4.

25

See CAMPBELL-KELLY 2003:231-66.

26

See CAMPBELL-KELLY 2003:269-301.
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capital into the industry and then a subsequent crash and weeding out when companies were not
able to produce results justifying the elevated equity valuations of 2000 and 2001.
As I write, a major fissure is developing between proprietary and open source models of
software development. The traditional model of development has been a proprietary one, where
a firm develops a product and then profits by sales of that product. Recently, some firms have
rejectedthat model , at least in part, to engage in open source development. Open source
development generally proceeds on the premise that software products developed under that
model will not be subject to the proprietary control of any individual or firm.27 I discuss the
relation between open source development and patent protection in subpart IV(C), but two points
are important to the present discussion. First, the demarcation between the two models is not as
complete as open source proponents might suggest. Rather, proprietary firms take advantage of
open source development under many business models.28 Second, to the extent there is a
demarcation, this project is focused on firms that are expected to receive revenues from the sale
of software products.
A remarkable feature of the industry as it has matured is the lack of concentration – a
facet that has considerable implications for the competitive structure of the industry and its
openness to innovation.29 Although press reports (and much of the academic writing as well) are
preoccupied with concerns about the dominance of Microsoft, the industry is populated with an
unusually large number of significant commercial players. Census Bureau statistics report more
than 40,000 firms in the industry as of 2000.30 Nearly 500 firms in the industry had a million or
more dollars in sales in 2003, even after the contractions in the industry at the turn of the
millennium.31 In 2002, 209 firms received their first round of venture capital financing, a total of
$872 million (an average of more than $4 million for each firm) during a markedly down year.32

27

For a brief overview, see Zittrain 2004.

28

A common tactic is to rely on open source development and consequent standardization of
auxiliary products in which a firm is unlikely to obtain a comparative advantage, coupled with profitable
marketing of an ancillary product or service over which the firm can maintain such an advantage. See
FINK 2002 (discussing how proprietary firms can profit from association with open source products);
LEONARD 1995:18-27 (discussion of core capabilities and their importance to strategic decision making);
see also MANN & WINN 2005 (discussing hybrid open source licenses that permit proprietary exploitation
of derivative products).
29

The fractionation is not new, see, e.g., CAMPBELL-KELLY 2003:167 (noting that the software
industry by the early 1980’s was much less concentrated than the parallel hardware industry out of which
it had grown), but it has accelerated since the rise of the Internet.
30

I aggregate data from NAICS 5112 (Software Publishers) and 541511 (Custom Computer
Programming
Services.
The
data
are
available
at
http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/industry/E541511.HTM
and
http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/industry/E5112.HTM (both last visited on Oct. 7, 2003).
31

The information is available at www.softwaremag.com (last visited May 6, 2004).

32

During 2002, 652 software companies received a total of $4.3 billion (that is, 443 firms
received second or subsequent rounds during 2002). Since 1995, 2907 new firms have received venture
capital financing. 2003 NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 40.
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Moreover, despite the existence of some prominent firms, the number of large firms is very small
– there are only three software firms in the current Fortune 500. Indeed, the top ten firms in
revenue had less than thirty percent of the revenues of the industry as a whole.
Another important point is the ebb and flow of IP protection for software for much of the
industry’s history. Although the form of the protection has changed over time, I share Rob
Merges’s view that “[t]he United States has traditionally embraced strong protection for
computer software.”33 In the early days, it was generally believed that it was “trivially easy to
replicate” the software program of a competitor.34 When initial efforts by major industry players
to obtain patents on their products were unsuccessful,35 firms (and Congress) turned to copyright
as an alternative.36 The Copyright Office formally decided to permit registration of programs in
the mid-1960’s.37 Initially, this was a promising arrangement, based on an analogy of literary
expression to the lines of code of which a software program is composed.38 Thus, until the late
1980’s, copyright provided relatively strong protection for software.39
Over the years, however, as the courts became familiar with software cases, the courts
narrowed copyright protection so that it ceased to provide robust protection.40 The problem that
courts increasingly confronted was that “there is nothing in the statute nor in the legislative
history to indicate that Congress intended for copyright to protect the results (that is, behavior)
brought about by the execution of program instructions.”41 Thus, in Computer Associates v.
Altai in 1992, the Second Circuit adopted a “hard-look” framework that made it difficult to
obtain copyright protection for the broader structural features of programs. The court limited
protection to specific pieces of the program limited to “expression.”42 Two years later, the Ninth
Circuit refused to protect Apple’s graphical user interface from appropriation by Microsoft.43
The façade of pervasive copyright protection came crashing to a definitive ruin with the

33

Merges 1996a:277.

34

CAMPBELL-KELLY 2003:107.

35

See CAMPBELL-KELLY 2003:107; Menell 2002:15-16 (discussing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63 (1972)).
36

Congress codified a definition of computer program as “a set of statements or instructions to be
used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. See
Menell 2002:16-20 (discussing that history).
37

Menell 2002:16.

38

See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983)
(copyright protection for Apple’s code).
39

Merges 1996a:277-78; Menell 2002:19-20; Graham & Mowery 2002:7-8.

40

Graham & Mowery 2002:8-9.

41

Samuelson, Davis, Kapor & Reichman 1994:2351.

42

23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241; Merges 1996a:277-278.

43

Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.2d 1435 (1994); Menell 2002:45-46.
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celebrated decision of the First Circuit three years later in Lotus Development Corp v. Borland
Int’l, Inc.44
Yet, long before those decisions limited the overarching importance of copyright
protection, major firms in the industry had begun to turn to patent protection. Direct protection
of software patents was difficult in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Gottschalk
v. Benson.45 Still, several of my interviews suggest that software patents were easy to obtain.
Because much of the software through the 1980’s was produced by hardware firms, patents
easily could be obtained on an object (a microprocessor), programmed to accomplish the relevant
function.46 To be sure, that artifice was not effective in the 1990’s when pure software firms like
Microsoft started to play major roles, because those firms could appropriate the innovation of
those patents in a software program without infringement. By that time, however, patent
doctrine had changed so that patent protection was available, at least to those firms that were
sufficiently familiar with the process to exploit it.47
In sum, despite the contrary mythology of a golden age of IP freedom, it is not clear that
there was any time when software was not protected by IP. When copyright protection seemed
likely to provide adequate protection, many who were active in the industry thought that patent
protection would be counterproductive.48 Nevertheless, as it became increasingly clear that
copyright protection would be inadequate, the supporters of patent protection in the industry
gained force, so that many of the leading firms now have large numbers of patents. This Article
considers the role those patents have come to play as the industry has matured.
III. Do Patents Induce Commercialization in the Software Industry?
As suggested above, it is difficult to develop any concrete understanding about the effects
patents might have on innovation in a particular industry. Even if we assume that all increases in
innovative activity are positive,49 it is difficult to separate economic effects related to the legal
artifact of patent protection from the effects of the innovation for which the patent is granted.50
Recognizing that difficulty, this Part of the Article examines the potential positive effects of
patents in the software industry.51

44

49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) (no copyright protection for pull-down menus in spreadsheet

program).
45

409 U.S. 63 (1972) (barring patent on algorithm); see Menell 2002:16.

46

Witek Interview; Hill Interview

47

Merges 1996a:278-81; Menell 2002:15; Graham & Mowery 2002:9.

48

LESSIG 2001:207-08; Menell 2002:15; Graham & Mowery 2002:10-11.

49

See supra note 18.

50

See Moser 2003.

51

The closest approach to such an examination in the existing literature is the discussion in
Merges 1996a that suggests that the stronger patent protection in the United States (as compared to Japan)
helped support the development in the United States in the early 1990’s of custom software developers.
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To understand the effect of patents on the development of software, I focus on small
firms, which typically are venture backed. Several related considerations support that choice.
First, and most obviously, many of the most important innovations in the software industry come
from relatively small firms. Yet the scholarship to date focuses exclusively on large publicly
traded firms. Second, the complex capital arrangements of public firms make it harder to
analyze the relationship between patent portfolios and the flow of capital into and out of those
firms. Thus, a study of the simpler arrangements of venture-backed firms is preferable. The
final point relates to the nature of qualitative interviews. Generally, it is easier to obtain reliable
interviews from smaller firms and their venture capital investors than from large firms. It is less
common at a large firm to find a person with complete hands-on responsibility both for the
financing arrangements and for the policies with respect to the development and protection of IP.
Executives at larger firms also are much more likely to articulate views constrained by the legal
positions underlying the broader interests of the firm, and thus relatively unlikely to engage in
the kinds of wide-ranging conversations likely to provide useful information to the quasianthropological research that I conduct. Moreover, the venture capital investors have highly
diversified experiences relevant to my inquiries. Many have experienced good and bad returns
on literally dozens of investments, with considerable insight about what makes the investments
good and bad, and many have had previous careers as entrepreneurs themselves, giving them a
more complete perspective.
This Part proceeds in three steps. First, I discuss the goals of the venture capital
investors, which relate to the likelihood that a portfolio firm can differentiate itself from its
competitors in a reliable way. Second, I analyze the ability of patents to satisfy that goal.
Although the discussion evinces pessimism about patents as a mechanism for appropriability in
the software industry, it also emphasizes a shift in the efficacy of patents as firms grow. Thus, I
discuss a number of reasons why patents are not likely to further that goal in the earliest stages of
a software firm, before it has revenues or begins shipping a product. Then, I show how once the
firm moves beyond infancy – to a stage with revenues or a product – patents can have a variety
of beneficial effects. That section provides a framework for relating the evidence drawn from
my interviews with the existing analytical literature, teasing out of that pattern a set of direct and
indirect positive effects that patents can have in various circumstances.
A. Venture Capitalists and Sustainable Differentiation
The development of software is expensive and time consuming. Thus, it is not common
for a successful product to be developed by an individual developer working in his spare time.
Rather, most commercial software products are the result of years of effort. That effort, in turn,
inevitably requires the expenditure of considerable monetary resources. Of course, young firms
can – and normally are expected to – go a considerable way toward developing their concept
without using the funds of third parties. At some point, however, they will exhaust their own
resources and the readily available resources of friends and family members.52

52

See MAY & SIMMONS 2001:32-33.
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At that point, in most cases, the firm will turn to institutional investment. One of the
most prominent and common53 sources of that investment is a venture capitalist.54 Venture
capital firms are intermediaries that raise funds from institutional investors (corporate pension
plans and the like) and invest those funds in startup companies in technology areas.55 There is a
vast literature on the structure of the industry, including detailed studies of many aspects of the
contract structures that those firms use in dealing with their investors and with the portfolio
companies in which they invest.56 For the purpose of this study, however, the structure of the
venture capitalist is relatively unimportant. What is important for this study is understanding as
precisely as possible what characteristics of a portfolio firm are important in leading a venture
capitalist to invest. Although there is little quantitative empirical work on that question,57 the
most obvious role that IP protection might play in that process is that the monopoly that it grants
on the exploitation of a covered technology will cause investment to flow into the firm that has
created the technology. The monopoly could support such a flow of investment – at least in
theory – by creating market power that would allow the firm to earn supranormal profits by
exploiting the technology in question.
The first point to understand about startup companies is that the uniqueness of the firm’s
product is not likely to be one of the primary issues a potential venture capital investor will
analyze in deciding whether to invest in the firm.58 Rather, the investor is likely to start by
focusing on issues that validate the core competency of the firm to execute its concept

53

Angel investors provide a source of financing that is parallel (or, in some cases, preliminary) to
venture capital investment. Their role in very early stages is evident in the results of one survey finding
that angels provide initial funding for more small, high-growth companies than venture capitalists. See
MAY & SIMMONS 2001:32. That does not suggest that angels finance more firms than venture capitalists,
only that they are particularly common in the earliest stages of a firm’s development. Even in those
cases, venture capital funding is likely to be important at some stage of the firm’s development. Angel
investors tend to be successful business executives investing the profits from their earlier endeavors in a
much less formal way than venture capitalists. The limited interviews with angel investors and the scant
literature on the subject suggest that the perspective of the typical angel investor is quite similar to the
venture capital perspective. See MAY & SIMMONS 2001:170-71 (reporting advice from Guy Kawasaki);
Jackson Interview; Lord Interview.
54

For a discussion of the impact of venture capital financing on small firms and the economy as a
whole, see GOMPERS & LERNER 2001:41-83.
55

For a discussion of how venture capital organizations operate, see GOMPERS & LERNER
2001:87-115.
56

For a collection of quantitative analyses of those topics, see GOMPERS & LERNER 2000. For a
good summary, see Klausner & Litvak 2001.
57

Hellman & Puri 2000 presents data indicating that venture capitalists are more likely to invest
in “innovative” first movers than “imitative” second movers. The generality of that argument deprives it
of much force on the questions about IP at the heart of my work.
58

A typical comment is that entrepreneurs are naïve if they think they have discovered a valuable
product idea for which there is no competition. ADAMS 2002:20-21. Indeed, the absence of competition
generally is regarded as a bad signal, because it suggests that the idea is not worth pursuing. See ADAMS
2002:21; MAY & SIMMONS 2001:170.
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successfully.59 For example, investors will be interested in such things as experience in the
relevant market and the skills of the management team.60 One remarked: “Every company of
mine that has failed has been mismanagement of executives, not technical failure.”61 Similarly,
even before investors consider whether a firm can protect a market leader position, they will
want to know whether the product is one that customers need so desperately that the firm can
gain a significant place in the market.62
Still, for firms that have a credible product idea and the expertise to implement it, venture
capitalists plainly accept the idea that their goal is to identify firms that will have sufficient
market power to earn extraordinary profits. IP protection is important only indirectly, as a tool
that might provide that market power. The key is “sustainable differentiation”63: something
special about the particular firm that will enable it to do something that its competitors will not
be able to do for the immediate future. The interviews also reflect more picturesque terminology
– referring to “secret sauce”64 or “magic dust.”65 But it is clear that the key to a desirable
investment opportunity is in the expectation of market power, with all other attributes of the
company being indirect predictors of that ultimate goal.66
For example, investors commonly referred to lead-time or first-mover advantages.67 The
premise was that a portfolio company that truly was the first to provide a sophisticated and
functional response to an important problem could expect to earn a supranormal return for years
to come.68 Interestingly enough, the expectation rested on the perception that a firm could

59

See Harding Interview:2 (“There are competitors that probably have equally as good software
[as we do, but] they can’t do the implementations [for the customers].”).
60

See ADAMS 2002:27-39 (discussing “execution intelligence”), 125-52 (discussing the
importance of the management team in securing funding); MAY & SIMMONS, supra note 52, at 171.
61

Lee Interview: 2; see Subhedar Interview:1 (“The most important thing is execution.”).

62

See ADAMS 2002:49-68 (discussing “market validation” and the need to develop a product that
responds to customer “pain”); Gauer Interview:2 (“The point is whether there is a pain point in the market
to which these people are going to apply a pain reliever.”); Kielb Interview:1.
63

Lee Interview:1.

64

Lee Interview:1.

65

See Weghorst Interview:3.

66

See Rightmer Interview:1 (comment of developer that IP “is a check-list item on [VC’s] list.
What they’re really looking for is barriers to entry.”); Subhedar Interview:1 (“[T]here could be patent
protection, but that in and of itself is not what you’re looking for. Really what you’re looking for is how
are you going to sustain your position.”).
67

See ADAMS 2002:73-94; D’Eath Interview:6; E. Jones Interview:2-3 (discussing benefits of an
“installed base” of users in maintaining recognition as a market leader); Rightmer Interview:1 (explaining
that his firm’s success hinges on getting customers to “lock-in” to his product because they can afford to
change products “only once every ten years”); Sikora Interview:1.
68

Hellman & Puri (2000) provide empirical evidence that VCs are more likely to fund startups
with first-moving “innovative” products rather than second-moving “imitative” products.
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maintain a lead on its rivals as long as it kept improving its technology as quickly as its
competitors.69 I rarely if ever heard investors (as opposed to developers) who expected portfolio
firms to obtain and keep a strong market position through “lock-in” or “bandwagon” effects.70
That is not to say that IP protection is unimportant. It is clear, however, that different
investors have different views about it.71 Some feel that intellectual property always is
important, and claim that they never invest without strong patentable technology.72 Even those
investors, however, go on to say that they are not as interested in the IP protection as in
technology that is sufficiently cutting-edge to warrant protection.73 Others, however, particularly
those that emphasize early-stage companies, say that IP protection is unimportant for software
investments.74 Still others take a middle position, holding that IP protection matters some, but
not all, of the time.75 Most of those who addressed the subject recognized differing perspectives
on the point and argued that those with the other perspectives are misguided.76 The most likely
explanation is that investors are simply implementing different investment models based on their
particular expertise.
69

See D’Eath Interview:6; Kielb Interview:2; Sikora Interview:1 (arguing that his firm’s lead
time of 6 months over its competitors is important: “9 women can’t make a baby in one month. There
are problems that just take a certain amount of time to solve”); Weghorst Interview:3 (“Sustainable
differences are typically time and materials put into [the software].”). {The Sikora quote apparently is an
allusion to a famous comment by IBM chairman Tom Watson, Jr. related to development of the seminal
OS/360 software product: “The bearing of a child takes nine months, no matter how many women are
assigned.” Quoted in CAMPBELL-KELLY & ASPRAY 1996:199.}
70

“Lock-in” or “bandwagon” effects occur when the value of a particular technology increases
with the number of other users, and have the potential to allow a particular technology to remain
dominant even when later, superior technologies appear on the market. For general discussion, see
ROHLFS 2001; see also LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS 1999 (arguing that inefficient lock-in rarely occurs, with
numerous examples from the software industry).
71

Cf. GOMPERS & LERNER 2000:47 (discussing a variety of investment perspectives without
specifically referring to IP protection).
72

See Inman Interview:1; Lee Interview:1; Jackson Interview:4; Murphree Interview:1.

73

See Lee Interview:1 (suggesting that the “next step” is whether you want to “open your
kimono” a little bit by having the technology registered for protection).
74

See Adams Interview:1 (“Quite frankly from an investor’s standpoint, IP protection doesn’t
mean a whole lot.”); Denniston Interview:1 (“Software is unique in that we don’t look for IP
protection.”); Gauer Interview:2 (“[P]atentable work tends to correlate with working in new areas and
being world-class in those areas but I would never make an investment decision based on whether there is
a patent or not or whether I thought a patent application would be successful.”); E. Jones Interview:2
(looking for “something unique” rather than something that is patented because patents are not worth the
expense in most software investments); Treybig Interview:1 “[P]atents imply a contribution, it helps
evaluate the company and what they’re creating that’s different, that can let them win.”).
75

Stephenson Interview:1.

76

Compare Inman Interview:1 (criticizing investors who “claimed that IP was nonsense”), with
Gauer Interview:3 (arguing that emphasis on copyright and patent protection illustrates that the Southern
California venture-capital industry is “less mature” than the Northern California industry).

11

12

Software Patents

July 27, 2004 Draft

B. Patents and Sustainable Differentiation
If understanding what venture capitalists want is the first question, the second question is
understanding whether they believe that patents can provide it. On that point, investors and
developers discern a balance of interests that shifts as the firm grows, from the earliest stage,
where patents are not often helpful, through intermediate stages to the terminal stage of the
venture-backed firm (just before an acquisition or IPO) where patents are almost universally
viewed as useful.
1. The Basic Problem: Patents and Appropriability
A basic problem with patents for software firms at all stages is the sense that even with a
patent it often is difficult for a firm to “appropriate” the value of its invention.77 Specifically, my
interview subjects agreed that competitor s usually could implement most of the aspects of a
software product that a patent might protect without infringing the patent.78 One reason for that
problem is the multifarious nature of software innovation, which permits many solutions to any
particular problem. Another contributing factor is the poor match between patents and products
in the industry: it is difficult to patent an entire product in the software industry, because any
particular product is likely to include dozens if not hundreds of separate technological ideas.
Thus, it may take a number of novel ideas – and patents – to build a defensible barrier around a
product.79 Another problem is that the technology tends to develop so rapidly that by the time a
patent is issued – and the formal right to exclusivity commences – the technology may be
obsolete for all but the broadest patents.80 Litigation at that point will involve efforts by the
patent owner to challenge technology of a subsequent generation where application of the patent
may be less clear.81

77

The literature on appropriability is Teece 1986 and Levin et al. 1987. The insights of those
papers are that (1) the ability of businesses to appropriate the value of innovation differs from industry to
industry; and (2) the mechanisms that businesses use to appropriate the value of innovation differ in their
effectiveness from industry to industry.
78

See Beauchamp Interview:4 (discussing ease of working around software patents); Harding
Interview:1 (“There are a lot of ways to work around patents.”); E. Jones Interview:2 (“[I]n software it is
so easy to change things that it is so easy to do the same function, but do it in a different way.”); Van
Arsdale Interview:3 (“Most patents you can get around. * * * * There’s always a way to do it different.
Some times you have to spend as much money as the patent holder spent, but that doesn’t mean you
can’t.”).
79

A biotech startup, by contrast, can build a defensible barrier around its product with one patent
or only a few patents on the relevant composition or process. Thus, a biotech startup more readily can use
patents to appropriate the value of its invention.
80

See Rightmer Interview:1 (“The technology moves so fast and the Patent Office moves so
slow.”); Weghorst Interview:4-5 (explaining that the exclusivity period of the patent is “out of sync” with
the timing of the value of the innovation).
81

See Cohen & Lemley 2001.
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That problem is not universal. As I discuss below, some patentees manage to obtain
patents of sufficient breadth that all possible solutions to an important problem would infringe
the patent. More broadly, some knowledgeable observers attribute it not to the nature of
software technology, but to the infancy of the industry. Because the industry is developing so
rapidly, some argue, the nature of technology and even of technological developments is so
poorly understood that firms do not understand the value they could appropriate from patents if
they pursued them in an informed way.82 From this perspective, the relatively limited
appropriability provided by software patents should be compared not to the relatively high
appropriability of hardware patents,83 but to the even more limited appropriability that software
patents provided a decade ago. The expectation, then, is that in a matter of decades software
technology will be as effectively subject to patent protection as the related hardware technology
is at this time.
For now, despite those qualifications, the relevant point is that for most firms, most of the
time, there is little prospect that the patents they obtain will provide market power that they can
use to exclude competitors. That point is underscored by the relative infrequency with which
venture-backed software startups have patents. For comparative purposes, consider that only
about 20% of venture-backed software companies will have a patent within five years of their
first financing (with each of those firms holding about two patents), while more than half of
biotech startups will have patents by that time (with each of those firms having about seven
patents).84
2. Patents and Pre-Revenue Startups
In addition to the problem that patents often are not an optimal mechanism for
appropriating the value of software innovation, a number of considerations make it particularly
difficult for early-stage companies to employ patents effectively. The key points here are the
limited efficacy of litigation for those firms, the constraints on resources that make it infeasible
to focus on patenting, and the limited value to pre-revenue firms of excluding competitors.

82

That view is stated most clearly in Dinkin Interview. It resonates strongly with SPAR 2001.

83

Many of my interview subjects expressed the view that software patents generally are not as
valuable as hardware patents. See, e.g., Bishop Interview:2 (endorsing the view that software patents
generally are easier to work around than hardware patents, particularly when they are method patents:
“Software is so malleable that it is easy to exploit the idea.”); E. Jones Interview:1 (explaining that
patents on software are generally less useful than patents on hardware); Kielb Interview:1 (emphasizing
the range in utility of patents among industries, with software generally at the low end); Treybig
Interview:2 (suggesting that hardware patents have more potential to exclude competitors than software
patents). For a contrasting view, see Dinkin Interview:12-13 (arguing that the difference in valuation of
patents relates to the relative youth of the software industry); Treybig Interview:6 (suggesting that when
the industry matures software patents and hardware patents will have similar values).
84

Details of that empirical research are in a forthcoming paper with Tom Sager. The research is
based an a dataset of all venture-backed firms in the software and biotech sectors that received their first
financing in 1998 or 1999 (about 800 software firms and 170 biotech firms), analyzing that patents that
those firms held on December 31, 2003.
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(a) The Perils of Small-Firm Litigation
On the first point, even if an early-stage company had a patent, it is unlikely that it would
have available resources to commence litigation to enforce the patent against a competitor.85
That is particularly true when the competitor is a large firm. One problem is the disparity in
litigation resources. One investor emphasized the concern that a large defendant would “rain
lawyers on your head and tie you up in court for the next ten years.”86 A somewhat different
concern about suing a large firm is the likelihood that the large firm might have a patent that the
small firm infringes. If so, the lawsuit might simply alert the large firm to the presence of the
small firm.87
A related concern is that firm culture is degraded when a firm must rely on licensing
revenues instead of developing its own product.88 Interestingly enough, that sentiment was
expressed even at the firms that rely heavily on licensing revenues. Those firms emphasized
efforts to maintain a product-centered culture emphasizing production of the firm’s own
products.89 One explained the cultural risk as follows:
You don’t need sales people; you need attorneys. You don’t need
solutions architects; you need accountants. So you wind up losing the very people
who are, who were, and who continue to be constructive * * * and innovative and
help you build things and would give us a continuing competitive advantage.90

85

See Gill Interview:1 (emphasizing that the cost of enforcement is more of a barrier than the cost
of obtaining the patent); Harding Interview:1 (“We just don’t have a large enough war chest at this point
in our life cycle. Down the road we might be more aggressive once we have enough cash to do it.”).
86

Murphree Interview:1; see Abbott Interview:5; Adams Interview:1 (“The ability to defend your
patents is only as big as your bank account. And nobody wants to pump money in to do that before you
have money to fund that from operating income. * * * * [I]f your only hope to make the company work is
to go to court and win nobody is going to invest.”); Beauchamp Interview:5 (“[A]s a start-up, it’s unlikely
that we are going to leverage [our] patents in any kind of lawsuit.”); Weghorst Interview:5 (explaining
that a patent would have little value for an early-stage startup because competitors would doubt his will
and ability to enforce it). This point is not new, of course. Cohen et al. report a similar finding in their
cross-industry surveys. Cohen et al. 2000:14-16.
87

Rightmer Interview:1. Thus, to that executive at least, it surely came as no surprise when IBM
responded in the summer of 2003 to SCO’s noted lawsuit regarding Linux with a counterclaim alleging
that SCO’s software infringes a number of IBM’s patents. See, e.g., Stephen Shankland, Big Blue Files
Counterclaims Against SCO (Aug. 7, 2003), available at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_25060965.html. For a similar perspective, see VON HIPPEL 1988:53 (discussion of responding to a charge
of infringement in the semiconductor industry by mailing back to the complainant “’a pound or two’ of its
possible germane patents”).
88

Van Arsdale Interview:2. In response to a question, he emphasized that IBM is not a counterexample to that reasoning, explaining that despite the “huge asset” of IBM’s patent portfolio IBM has
managed to maintain a culture firmly focused on developing its own competitive products. Id.
89

Kalinoski Interview 2:4; Thomas Interview 2:3.

90

Thomas Interview:3.
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Indeed, at the one firm that had a major licensing program, the entire program was entrusted to
third-party professionals, so that it would not interfere with the focus of the on-site software
engineers.91
(b) Diversion of Focus
Similarly, many investors and developers emphasized that attention to patents can be
damaging to a startup, because it has the potential to divert limited time and resources from what
is likely to be a highly time-pressured effort to develop a product and convince customers and
investors of its worth before the firm runs out of capital resources.92 One investor explained:
“[We] typically find that the companies that focus on just patents don’t have the right view of
what is important, and they really are therefore not successful in business. And they’re usually
not around to prosecute their patents.”93 Developers understand the point well. As one said:
“Every dollar we spend on [patenting] is a dollar we can’t spend on a software engineer.”94
Another, with a patent-leaning background from his days at IBM commented: “Patentability is
something we will pursue, but let’s get the product out first.”95
Thus, a young company is presented with a challenging task. If the nature of the firm’s
innovation is such that IP is ever likely to be important, it must spend sufficient resources on the
protection and development of intellectual property from the earliest days of the company – as an
investment in the possibility that the firm might at some point grow to the point where the IP is
useful.96 The firm that fails to protect its IP at the earliest stage is like a desperate ship at sea that
empties its water in the hope of evading a faster pursuer: it might survive for the time being, but
it may have sown the seeds of its inevitable failure if it survives to a later stage.97 On the other
hand, it must not spend so much that the company fails before it is able to recoup its investment.

91

Thomas Interview:4.

92

See Denniston Interview:1 (“For Series-A firms, there just isn’t the budget for patenting.”); E.
Jones Interview:3 (“It was better to spend the time continuing to advance the technology than it was to
push people off to the side and have them focus on creating the patents and work on it.”); Kielb
Interview:1 (the cost of diverting the “time, attention, energy, and focus” of personnel to a “suboptimal”
use is more important than the monetary cost of obtaining a patent); Treybig Interview:6 (“If you’re a
small company, and unless you have a hell of a patent, it’s pretty hard to spend money on patents versus
another salesman or something.”).
93

Subhedar Interview:4.

94

Harding Interview:1; see Bishop Interview:2 (former IBM executive now leading startup
explaining shift in philosophy among investors so that now “there is a lot more interest in getting the
product out than in having patents”); Rightmer Interview:1 (discussing costs of documentation necessary
to protect the ability to obtain patent’s on the firm’s innovation).
95

Bishop Interview:2.

96

See Gill Interview:1 (explaining that the strategy is to obtain patents early “knowing that you
won’t enforce them until later”).
97

The metaphor will be plain to readers of Patrick O’Brian.
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Firms have developed a number of strategies for dealing with that problem. Some
involve using half-measures to protect the IP, such as filing provisional applications,98 or
omitting standard practices related to documentation of the work of engineers.99 Those practices
do not directly abandon the IP, but they may make it more costly and difficult to protect it in the
future. The bottom line is that even for companies that have begun to earn to substantial
revenues it often does not seem appropriate to devote the resources necessary to ensure that all of
the firm’s innovations are patented.100 Others – it must be said that executives with prior
experience at large IP-sensitive firms like IBM101 or Bell Labs populate this category – seem to
relish the discipline of making sure that the IP is pinned down no matter how difficult it may
seem to find the time and resources to do so.102 It is plain that the difficulty of this strategic
choice, coupled with the difficulty in accurately predicting the future prospects for their products
and their IP, is a problem about which startup software executives worry constantly.103
Investors, of course, are aware of this problem. Their approach typically does not extend
to forcing (or even urging) their portfolio companies to seek patent protection. However, they do
go to considerable lengths to evaluate the IP that potential portfolio companies have. In a typical
process, the investor will know most of the reputable patent attorneys in the local community. If
one of those attorneys had filed a patent, the VC would discuss the patent with that lawyer. If an
attorney with whom the VC did not have a preexisting relationship filed the patent application,
the VC would have the patent studied by an attorney in whom it had confidence. In context, it
was clear that the intent of the examination was not purely technical – is this a patent likely to be
granted – but also a broader exercise to understand what type of market power the patent might

98

See Beauchamp Interview:3-4; Weghorst Interview:4.

99

See Weghorst Interview:6. The costs of a vigorous pursuit of that process are considerable.
One executive with experience at IBM and elsewhere suggested that as a rule of thumb he commits 4-8
engineer hours per week for the life of the application, examining, and issuance process. See Bishop
Interview:2.
100

Sikora Interview:1 (“Software companies are not 3M. We don’t organize our offices to get

patents.”).
101

IBM’s dominant patent portfolio is not an accident. It plainly has one of the most – if not the
most – patent intensive environments among American companies. See Dinkin Interview:3-5. IBM has
been the leading U.S. patentee every year since 1993, and IBM also appears to be the leading software
patentee. Manny Schecter, IBM’s Strategies for the Creation, Protection and Use of Intellectual Property
in
Software
(Nov.
30,
2001),
available
at
http://emertech.wharton.upenn.edu/ConfRpts_Folder/WhartonKnowledgeAssets_Report.pdf.
102

See Kalinoski Interview:2-4 (former IBM engineer leading startup company; describing
comprehensive incentive program designed to emphasize the importance of patenting to engineering
team).
103

See Abbott Interview:5 (explaining that the decision has to be made “looking at the amount of
time, dollars, and effort required that potentially could pay off huge in a couple of years”); Kalinoski
Interview:6 (discussing that choice and emphasizing that patents can be thoroughly protected only
through a conscious commitment: “You have to make a conscious decision – either you’re gonna do it, or
you’re not gonna do it.”): Thomas Interview:1 (“[I]t’s a mindset issue.”).
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(or might not) provide.104 In short, standard industry practice now views examination of that
market power as central to careful due-diligence practices.105 That practice at first seems to be in
tension with the thesis of this section – that patents have little value for the earliest-stage
startups. In fact, however, it leads into the point of the next section, that the firms that survive
their earliest days may reap substantial value from patents.
(c) The Limited Benefits of Exclusion
One final element of the patenting calculus for small firms may seem obvious, but is
worth noting. Because those firms do not yet have a product, they have no opportunity for
revenues. Thus, the benefits they reap from excluding competitors are minimal at best. Only if
they survive to a later stage – where they can hope to profit from their own exploitation of that
product – will they be able to reap any substantial value from the exclusion of competitors.
3. The Increasing Value of Patents for Later-Stage Startups
When firms mature to the point of having revenues, the systematic difficulties that plague
the efforts of pre-revenue startups to obtain and exploit patents dissipate. That does not mean,
however, that patents suddenly are the philosopher’s stone that will turn their creative endeavors
into IPO’s. Rather, the underlying problem of appropriability remains to plague most efforts to
use patents directly to exclude competitors. Still, my interviews suggest a series of benefits that
patents might provide for later-stage software startups. This section describes those benefits, by
reference to the bodies of existing literature that have offered them as theoretical possibilities.
(a) Direct Effects: Protecting a Space for Innovation
The most important point concerns the direct ability of the software patent to carve out
for the firm a space in which it can innovate without competition. I explain above that my
interview subjects often complain about the difficulty in using patents to exclude competitors.
Although there is some truth in both of those points, they are overgeneralizations, at least once a
firm reaches the stage at which it has designed a product that it can market to customers.
To respond directly to the first point, it is clear that some firms in the industry obtain a
substantial amount of revenues by licensing the use of their patents to competitors that need to
use the patented technology in their own products. Indeed, even in my limited sample three
small Austin companies – Applied Science Fiction,106 Bluecurrent,107 and Forgent108 – have

104

See Lee Interview:1: Murphree Interview:1 (emphasizing interest in how “defensible” the
market position is); Stephenson Interview:2.
105

See Fine & Palmer (in FROM IDEAS TO ASSETS) (discussing modern due-diligence practice for
IP assets); Haller et al. (in FROM IDEAS TO ASSETS) (same).
106

Urdahl Interview. Details regarding the amount of revenues do not appear to be public. For
press
releases
announcing
licensing
transactions,
see,
e.g.,
http://www.asf.com/events/press/092402_Konica_RS1.shtml,
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obtained substantial revenues from patent licenses. I do not believe that industry-wide statistics
quantify the size of that market, but it plainly is substantial. Those transactions – and others like
them – demonstrate that some software patents are sufficiently robust to allow their holders to
appropriate substantial value from the underlying inventions. Licensing transactions are
noteworthy given the difficulties small firms face in enforcing patents against large firms. As
discussed above,109 the small firm with a revenue-producing product must be quite confident in
the value of its technology before it wisely can cross swords with a company like IBM.
More generally, it seems clear that the received wisdom that patents are not useful to
appropriate software-related inventions is overstated. Two separate points are important. The
first is the distinction between the relative rarity of observed offensive use of patents – for outlicensing or litigation – and the use of patents to exclude competitors. The relative rarity of
offensive use of patents does not prove that the patents are not sufficiently robust to exclude
competitors. As discussed in the previous section, there are many reasons why a firm might
want to wait until late in its development to advertise the nature of its technology and its
proprietary claims to that technology.
A firm can refrain from offensive use of its patents and still derive important value from
the patents as a device to exclude competitors. Contrary to the perception that patents tilt the
playing field in favor of large incumbent firms to the disadvantage of small firms,110 patents in
this context afford a unique opportunity to the small startup.111 It is as if the patent system grants
the small firm an automatic stay of competitive activity, to remain in force long enough for the
firm to attempt to develop its technology. For large firms, the marginal increase in
appropriability that comes from patents may have little benefit: IBM could compete quite
successfully against smaller firms even if it did not have patents protecting its product from
copying competitors.112 For the smaller firm, however, the ability to prevent incumbents like

http://www.asf.com/events/press/Gretag.shtml, and http://www.asf.com/events/press/DurstSigma.shtml.
Applied Science Fiction now has been acquired by Kodak. www.asf.com.
107

Thomas
Interview;
http://online.wsj.com/article_email/0,,SB106677936791434300H9jeoNjlaR2nZyqZnqHcaeHm4,00.html.
108

Forgent’s patent on the .jpeg file format has produced tens of millions of dollars in revenues.
http://www.forgent.com/company/press_room/dallas_082802.shtml.
109

See supra note 87.

110

I discuss that perception in detail in Part IV.

111

My analysis here resonates with the general discussion in Barnett 2004. If we differ in
anything other than my contextual approach, it is in my view that the benefits of patents arise from a
much larger number of interrelated effects than those that he discusses, and in my view that patents are
quite valuable for large firms in addition to small firms.
112

That is not to say that patents are not valuable to IBM. As discussed below, IBM derives
substantial revenues from its software patent portfolio. I do argue, however, that patents play completely
different roles for small venture-backed firms and for incumbent dominant firms like IBM and Microsoft.
The relevant intuition here is that IBM’s legendary marketing prowess will allow it to win most contests
between reasonably equivalent products. The startup, however, can win those competitions only by
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IBM and Microsoft from taking its technology can be the difference between life and death. As
one executive put it: “What’s protected me from other people ripping [off our product] has been
the specter of patent infringement.”113
It is instructive to think of the offensive uses of software patents reported in the press.
Among the most famous incidents plainly are the successful attempts by small firms (Stax in the
mid-1990’s and Eolas in 2003) to force alterations in Microsoft products that arguably infringed
patents held by those firms, and the similar attempt by InterTrust to assert rights to digital rights
management technology important to several Microsoft products.114 The point is consistent with
empirical work suggesting that patents held by small firms are more likely to be litigated than
patents held by large firms.115
It also finds strong support in Bronwyn Hall’s recent work
suggesting that patent rights in complex product industries are more valuable for younger firms
than they are for older incumbent firms.116
The second point is that the ability of a patent to appropriate the value of an invention
will vary along several dimensions. One of the most common is the nature of the particular
innovation. Thus, it is considered futile to rely on a patent in which the innovation lies in a
method of writing software code.117 At the other end of the continuum, patents that protect an
ultimate functionality that the software provides or an algorithm necessary to provide that
functionality are more likely to be important in excluding potential competitors.118 Interestingly,
that distinction seems to undermine the conventional wisdom that “process” patents tend to be
less valuable than “product” patents.119 In the software industry, a patent on the product tends to
depriving IBM of the freedom to market a reasonably equivalent product. Thus, the patent’s ability to
exclude is considerably more valuable to the startup.
113

Thomas Interview:2.
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For
discussion
of
the
http://www.fortune.com/fortune/print/0,15935,400412,00.html.
over eBay surely deserves honorable mention.

InterTrust
litigation,
see
The recent victory by MercExchange
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Allison, Lemley, Moore & Trunkey 2003.

116

Hall 2004.

117

See Denniston Interview:1 (“Is there value in patenting lines of code? Almost never.”).

118

See Crouse Interview:1 (discussing range of patent significance at different sectors of
Microsoft’s operations); D’Eath Interview:5 (contending that his firm’s patents create a “competitive
barrier,” albeit not one of sufficient significance that it would interest investors); Eggleston Interview:2-3
(emphasizing the importance of patents to his company’s development, but acknowledging that they are
less important for most software companies); Jackson Interview 4 (“If you can get that kind of a business
methods patent or a kind of overall process patent for doing things in a certain way, I would say that
that’s quite important because of your ability to exclude others. * * * * Not having a patent doesn’t mean
you can’t build a business, but having a patent, in my view, certainly strengthens your position.”). The
perspective of a biotech executive was starkly different (as the data would suggest): “Intellectual property
in our industry is the number one reason people fund you or don’t fund you.” O’Connor Interview:1.
119

See Cohen et al. 2000:10 (empirical finding based on cross-industry surveys that process
patents are significantly less valuable than product patents). For a different categorization of software
innovation, see Gruner 2000:984-87 (three categories of conceptualization, coding, and external links).
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have relatively little value because of the ease of designing a distinct product. A patent on the
process that the product implements is much more likely to be valuable, if only because it often
is possible for the claimed process to be defined broadly enough to include all practical methods
of competition.120 Thus, to the extent that executives of firms with commercially valuable
patents had a view as to why their patents were valuable, they believed that it had nothing to do
with the nature of the innovation. Rather, they attributed it to the firm’s ability to obtain a patent
that staked out a sufficiently large field to cover all plausible variations on the relevant
technology.121
Related to that continuum is a sectoral variation. As the empirical data presented in the
companion paper with Tom Sager demonstrates, there is a strong variation in the rate of
patenting among the different sectors of the software industry. For example, the average number
of patents in the dataset was about 0.7 patents per firm. Several sectors, however, had markedly
higher rates, including graphics and digital imaging, expert systems and natural language,
multimedia, and security. At the same time, some relatively important sectors had unusually low
rates of patenting, including email and internet software, applications software, and financial
software.122 That variation is interesting, because it can be discerned in a quantitative way even
though patents are thought to be less valuable for software than they are for hardware, and even
though patents are much less common in the software industry than in some other industries,
biotech being the most commonly noted example and the one I analyze. It seems likely that the
variation is related at least in part to the nature of innovation in the different sectors, with higher
rates of patenting associated with types of innovation more susceptible of appropriation by
patent. However strongly my interview subjects rejected such a distinction,123 the data
powerfully suggest that further inquiry is warranted.
Taken together, those two points portray a world in which small firms struggle to
innovate, facing the pervasive concern that a competitor might appropriate any useful invention
at any time. Given the difficulties those firms face in sustaining differentiation, the likelihood
that patents can provide shelter for some firms is an important one. The extent of the shelter may
be difficult to predict – because it depends primarily on the breadth of market protection a patent
has by the time it is issued.124 Furthermore, the frequency of the shelter is open to doubt, as it
plainly was not relevant to most of the firms that I interviewed. The interviews that I discuss
above, however, suggest that it is real in the place where its effect would be most important, in
the minds of the firms doing the innovation. It certainly would be valuable to know more about
the frequency with which small firms obtain patents of sufficient strength to use in an offensive
way. However, even without that information, it is difficult to believe that this is not a major
part of what makes patents and their breadth an item of interest to investors.
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Thomas Interview:2; Urdahl Interview: Hill Interview: Witek Interview.
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Urdahl Interview; Thomas Interview; Oles Interview.
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The variance in the number of patents each firm has, and in the likelihood that a firm will have
any patents, is significant at the 1% level.
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See supra note 121.
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See Dinkin Interview.
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(b) Indirect Effects
The most intriguing information from my interviews relates to the benefits that patents
can provide firms in the industry even if they do not involve direct exploitation of the patents.
Those benefits fall into two classes: facilitation of a litigation-free zone through a pattern of
cross licensing; and a set of what I call “information” effects – beneficial effects that patents
have on information related to the firm’s technology.
(I)Facilitating a Licensing Equilibrium
As suggested above, many in the industry completely abjure any substantial use of
patents to exclude competitors. Rather, the most prominent explanation in the interviews is that
patents will be useful as “barter” in cross-licensing agreements that the firm would enter if it
reaches a sufficiently mature stage to be a significant player in the industry.125 Those with whom
I discussed the subject articulated a common vision of the way that firms gain access to protected
technology in the industry: they obtain a cross-license from existing industry members that have
patents that relate to their technology. To the extent that a growing firm has patents on its own
technology, it can reduce the cost of licensing technology from existing market players by
providing that technology as part of a cross-license agreement.126 The likelihood that the firm
will be asked at some point in time to enter such an agreement seems to be quite high. Interview
subjects acknowledged, for example, that their products might infringe a patent in IBM’s large
portfolio of software patents.127 Yet, a patent to offset IBM’s potential claim is of little value

125

Gans, Hsu & Stern (2002) provides a model indicating that this kind of cooperative licensing
works better with stronger patents, which is consistent with the more pervasive reliance on cross-licensing
in recent years.
126

See Abbott Interview:5 (offering IBM as the example of a potential cross-license partner);
Crouse Interview:1-2 (discussing value to Microsoft of building a patent portfolio for defensive
purposes); Gauer Interview:2 (“The patent comes in as a defensive mechanism down the road in the event
that we stumble upon something else that we’ve infringed on so that we have our arsenal in order and can
use it in a cross-license arrangement or the like.”); Kalinoski Interview:5 (describing use of patent to
offset request from IBM to pay royalties); Rightmer Interview:1; Subhedar Interview:2 (“You can usually
trade, you can usually cross-license if you have patents, so as the company grows bigger, there is value to
patent portfolios.”); Treybig Interview:1(“Patents may give them protection against the bigger company’s
patent portfolio. I mean, IBM has a room full of patents and it’s huge, to the wall, ceiling, and on and on,
so, it’s somewhat protection against the bigger companies if they have to come after them.”); Witte
Interview:1 (“And a classic case is IBM will show up and say, “I have this huge portfolio and you must
infringe some of mine because I have so many.” And then, of course, what you hope is that you have
been careful and selected some strategic technology to patent that they may infringe[, so that you can] use
that as a shield.”).
127

Rightmer Interview:1 (“IBM probably could sue us on 20 patents if they looked hard at what

we do.”).
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until IBM demands royalties, and IBM usually does not ask for royalties until a firm is earning
sufficient revenues to justify the inquiry.128
As a matter of policy, it is difficult to know how to evaluate that arrangement . One
perspective is that it reflects a classic instance in which sophisticated parties with repeat dealings
can reach a state of equilibrium, operating in the shadow of the law with relatively little active
conflict.129 The premise is that the firms with large portfolios will refrain from litigation in a
situation of “mutually assured destruction” from competing large portfolios. The destructive
capacity of those portfolios is enhanced by the nature of technology in the industry, which could
involve dozens of patentable innovations in any single product that a large firm might bring to
market. From that perspective, it is natural to believe that litigation occurs most often when the
equilibrium fails, when someone other than an active developer holds the patents,130 or when the
developer fails and loses all incentive to cooperate.
More broadly, however, it is difficult to see how that equilibrium can be regarded as a
positive benefit attributable to patents. The only benefit that cross-licensing agreements provide
is freedom from patent litigation. The cross-license agreements in question provide only
freedom of action; they do not involve the disclosure of technology or transfer of any knowledge
beyond material on the face of existing patents.131
I can postulate several ways in which cross licensing might provide net benefits. For
example, it might be easier to share technology cooperatively with a patent system rather than
without. Most obviously, patents provide a way to discipline firms that are not cooperative;
without patents, it would be difficult to discipline firms that seek to use their technological
developments offensively. Patents force firms that wish to use their technology offensively to
accept the likelihood of suit by other industry players for infringement of the patents held by

128

See Abbott Interview:6 (suggesting that IBM only pursues companies “with a certain revenue
baseline” and the need to get a patent “before you get on that radar”); Gauer Interview:3 (“A lot of times
the company is IBM or somebody big like that. At what point are they going to come after us? Most of
the time the answer is that we’re too small to bother with, but we have to have a strategy for how to deal
with them when it comes up – what might we have to trade them for license rights when we get bigger.”);
Treybig Interview:2-3 (discussing value of a patent for cross-licensing once you get on IBM’s “scope”).
For a good example from the hardware industry, consider the early history of Dell, when IBM
called seeking royalties shortly after the distribution of an early Dell product. Although those royalties
were a “significant hit” to the bottom line, Dell quickly obtained a few patents of its own, which it used to
alter the terms of its arrangement to one in which neither side pays royalties. Inman Interview:1.
129

The seminal discussion is Mnookin & Kornhauser 1979.
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Thus, much of the offensive patent litigation in the industry (discussed supra text
accompanying note 114) is brought by patent holding companies – which have no operating products and
exist solely to collect licensing revenues for patents that they have purchased from inventors. See
RIVETTE & KLINE 2000:135 et seq.; Dinkin Interview:11; Gauer Interview:3; Sikora Interview:1;
Subhedar Interview:2; Witte Interview:1; see also Burk & Lemley 2003 (characterizing such companies
as “trolls”). For further discussion of trolls, see infra subpart VI(B).
131

Hill Interview; Dinkin Interview.
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those players. In an industry where innovation is cumulative, where all products include
innovations of others, and where it is difficult to produce a product except in a company with
substantial funds, cross licenses could be important.
Similarly, patents might provide an effective way to evaluate the value of the technology
that each firm has to determine the amount and direction of payment that is appropriate for each
cross license. This might be particularly important in an industry, like the software industry, in
which there are a large number of players with widely varying patent portfolios. By contrast, in
an industry with a small number of relatively equal participants, a straight patent pool (without
pair-by- pair determinations of value) would make more sense.
Those arguments, however, strike me as post hoc justifications for a practice that at best
simply reduces the transaction costs that firms face in gaining access to patent-protected
technology. We know little about the terms of license agreements in the industry, or even the
frequency and extent to which license agreements involve the payment of license fees. We do
know, however, that it cannot be costless to acquire the patents that firms use to enhance their
licensing position. If those costs are incurred solely to minimize the costs of the patents that
other firms have, and if patents provide no other benefit, then it seems plain that patents would
not be providing any net benefit to the industry. Thus, however pervasive it was in my
interviews, and however important it is to understanding actual patenting practices, I do not give
great weight to the benefits ofcross licensing as a policy justification for patents in the industry.
(II) Information Effects
The last set of effects relate to information generated through the firm’s participation in
the patent system. Moving along the course of the firm’s development, these effects fall into
three classes: (A) the ability of patents to facilitate a firm’s efforts to codifying tacit knowledge,
(B) the firm’s subsequent ability to signal the discipline and technical expertise that allowed it to
codify that knowledge, and (C) the use of the patent as a signal of the underlying technology.132
o Facilitating the Codification of Tacit Knowledge
One of the most intriguing benefits of patents relates to Ashish Arora’s recent writings on
innovation. He argues that a key problem in transferring knowledge between firms is the ability
to convert tacit knowledge – which is difficult to verify or transfer – to codified knowledge,
which readily can be evaluated and transferred.133 Because a patent by definition – at least if it
satisfies the statutory criteria – includes the knowledge necessary to enable a person having
ordinary skill in the relevant art to replicate the invention, the existence of a patent is strong
evidence both that there in fact is substantial knowledge of some kind and that the knowledge is
not so bound up with the abilities of particular individuals as to be immovable.
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For a thorough discussion of the value of patents as signals, see Long 2002.
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ARORA, FOSFURI & GAMBARDELLA 2001:95-99.
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To the extent that a patent facilitates that process, it can provide real benefits to the firm:
codification of knowledge enhances its transferability and thus its value.134 This analysis has
found its way recently into the law review literature as well, in Paul Heald’s recent work on
transaction costs and patents.135 More generally, the idea resonates with the notion that
productive assets can have no value until they have been brought into a documentary system in
which they readily and reliably can be transferred from person to person.136 Thus, although my
interview subjects do not discuss “codification” of knowledge, they do emphasize the importance
that patents play in the acquisition of a startup firm.137 It seems plain to me that there is more
work to be done in understanding how patents serve to facilitate the transfer of knowledge – and
whether alternate systems could serve the same purpose without the costs of exclusivity. I
discuss those questions briefly below,138 but it is clear that more research would be necessary to
formulate any definitive views on the topic.
o Signaling Discipline and Expertise
Once knowledge has been codified in a patent, the existence of the patent itself can send
a signal of the skills necessary to obtain it, primarily engineering discipline and market
understanding. The premise is that firms that get patents tend to be more careful in their
engineering work and to understand what is special about their products better than competitors
that do not have patents. For example, one serial startup developer explained:
[I]n my experience, all a software patent buys you is the fact that you are
disciplined in your engineering approach and that it is reflected in your ability to
execute technically. Not that it is a means of protection for the investors to believe
that you’re gonna be the only person that’s gonna be able to solve this particular
problem.139
Those that articulate this line of reasoning generally view the signal as a true one – a
plausible indicator of valuable information about the firm that otherwise would be difficult to
discern.140 Notice, of course, that this use of patents says nothing about the uniqueness of the
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ARORA, FOSFURI & GAMBARDELLA 2001.
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Heald 2004.
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De Soto 2000.
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See Beauchamp Interview:5 (“It is a tangible asset that during an acquisition, the investors can
hold up to make the argument that they can increase the valuation of the company.”); Lee Interview:2.
That perspective appears to be justified – to some limited extent – by the attitudes of people at potential
acquirers. See Crouse Interview:2 (discussing importance of patents in Microsoft acquisitions); Van
Arsdale Interview:1 (same); see Witte Interview:4 (suggesting that a typical patent would be “asset
number 31” in the list of important assets being acquired).
138

See infra subpart VI(A).
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Beauchamp Interview:4.
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Gauer Interview:2 (“The fact that they were working on something that might be patentable
does tend to be tied with them working on new problems and suggests that they are up on the leading
edge of people tackling the kind of problems in which we’d like to invest. The patent itself, however,
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technology or the ability of the firm to exclude competitors. Rather, it reflects something
positive about the ability of the management team to focus and execute. That does not mean,
however, that the signal is not taken seriously. As discussed above, many investors think that
inadequate market analysis and execution are among the most common reasons for the failure of
startup companies.141
o Signaling Technology
When the firm reaches the stage at which it is considering acquisition or a public
offering, its patents may send a more direct signal of the underlying technology. As the
discussion below explains in more detail, larger firms are likely to value patents for reasons quite
different from those that motivate small firms: because they facilitate freedom of action by
helping the larger company avoid claims of infringement.142 Thus, investors consider the
existence of a patent to play a key role in influencing the “build-or-buy” decision of a larger
company: the hope is that the potential cost of patent infringement will make it cheaper for the
larger company to purchase the portfolio company rather than build the technology in-house.143
Even there, however, it is clear that the sophisticated acquirer will focus on the business model
that the company has adopted and whether that modelmakes sense apart from the IP that might

isn’t the point. * * * * The fact that people may have patentable work tends to correlate with working in
new areas and being world-class in those areas but I would never make an investment decision based on
whether there is a patent or not or whether I thought a patent application would be successful.”); Treybig
Interview:1 (“[P]atents give you some idea of ‘are these smart people I’m dealing with, that want to start
this company’?”).
141

The focus on the importance of execution is exemplified by the current New York Times
bestseller RAM CHARAN, EXECUTION: THE DISCIPLINE OF GETTING THINGS DONE 2002, a fixture on the
desks of startup executives that I have interviewed.
142

Claims of infringement might be more of a concern for a large firm because its revenue base is
so much larger that even a small royalty percentage could result in significant damages. The recent Eolas
case against Microsoft is a good example. Eolas received a $500 million verdict for technology that
affects, at most, a tiny portion of Windows Explorer. One report calculated that the dispute involved only
305 of the 56 million lines of code in Windows, but the plaintiff still received a royalty of $1.47 for each
copy of Windows. Viewed on a pro rata basis, that would suggest a value per copy of Windows of about
$500,000.
http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2003/09/22/few_celebrate_this_defeat_for_microsoft/. It
is worth noting that the technology in question was invented at the University of California. The patent
was licensed to Eolas, but the University of California will receive 25% of the proceeds from the
litigation. http://news.com.com/2100-1012-5062409.html.
143

See Beauchamp Interview:5 (“It is a tangible asset that during an acquisition, the investors can
hold up to make the argument that they can increase the valuation of the company.”); Lee Interview:2;
Oles Interview; Urdahl Interview. That perspective appears to be justified – to some limited extent – by
the attitudes of people at potential acquirers. See Crouse Interview:2 (discussing importance of patents in
Microsoft acquisitions); Van Arsdale Interview:1 (same); see Witte Interview:4 (suggesting that a typical
patent would be “asset number 31” in the list of important assets being acquired).
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protect the underlying technology.144 For example, consider the following comments about
Google (a firm that, incidentally, has two patents):
Do you think the big asset for Google is patents? No, it’s a business
model that’s working and making money. Do you think patents are something
they’re not being stupid about. They’re filing patents and being careful on the off
fear that Microsoft might sue them. Do you think they’ve built into their S-1 or
their business plan that they plan on using their patent portfolio directly? No
way.145
That same explanation can be seen in a much more negative way if it is thought that the
patents will not ultimately bring any value to the balance sheet of the acquiring firm. This view
on the role of patents in acquisition characterizes them as valuable for “marketing,”146
convincing the investors in public markets that the company’s technology is valuable.147 The
idea is that sophisticated investors at the early stage can evaluate the “true” value of the
technology based on a careful analysis of such factors as the company’s product, the customer’s
needs for that product, and the personnel that the company employs to execute its business plan.
Thus, the patent has only secondary significance to those investors. Customers or later-stage
investors, by contrast, are said to be less willing to undertake such careful evaluations.148 Thus,
the argument goes, they tend to rely (less thoughtfully) on the mere existence of patents in the
company’s portfolio.149 That argument is made particularly with respect to protecting the
downside in the event of a company’s failure.150 Interestingly, developers often present a similar
argument about venture capitalists, arguing that they obtain patents that have no real value to
them, in part because they will look good to venture capitalists.151 The truth of that view in any
particular context is of course difficult to assess.
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See Van Arsdale Interview:2-3.
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Van Arsdale Interview:3.
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In contrast to the “signal” that the patent provides to the sophisticated investor, the value of the
patent from this negative perspective is characterized as “optical”: something that enhances the
appearance of the company but does nothing for the underlying economics or prospects of the firm. See
Abbott Interview:5. Bartow 2000:8-9 makes this point vigorously.
147

See Weghorst Interview:5 (discussing “marketing leverage” with investors).
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See Costello Interview:1; Abbott Interview:5.
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See D’Eath Interview:5 (explaining that his firm’s patents would be important to potential
“acquisitors” though probably not to venture-capital investors).
150

See Enroth Interview:1 (discussing a “perception that’s around that if you have patented
something that there’s really got to be some level of perceived value there, so if you’re liquidating it there
is a different level of ability to get some value out of that compared to something that is viewed as not
proprietary”); Inman Interview:1 (discussing “residual value” in intellectual property that returned some
value to investors when startup failed in the market); Stephenson Interview:1 (“IP is something that in the
downside case we can sell off and make something.”).
151

See Abbott Interview:5; Rightmer Interview:1.
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4. Patents and Large Firms
Although the bulk of my interviewing base is small venture-backed startups of varying
sizes, the interviews and publicly available information do provide enough information to give a
good idea of the role that patents play in large firms. Because much of the information is plain
from the discussion above, I discuss that topic briefly solely to complete the picture.
First, as discussed above, large firms gain relatively little from litigation or the exclusion
of competitors from patented spaces, because large firms often can compete successfully with
small firms without excluding the competitor. The saying that “nobody ever got fired for buying
IBM [or Microsoft]” is not baseless, and in a contest between IBM and a small startup, both with
equivalent products, IBM (or Microsoft) often will prevail. In contests among large firms,
litigation will be rare because of cross licensing of portfolios.152
Second, patents will provide considerable benefits to large firms by enabling them to
participate in cross-licensing agreements that give them the freedom of action to design and
deploy products as they wish, without regard to the IP portfolios of competitors. It may be, as I
argue above, that the large firms that use their portfolios solely for that purposes would be better
off without the costs of developing and maintaining those portfolios, but in the existing milieu,
each firm has a strong incentive to collect patents for that purpose.
Third, many (though certainly not all) large firms will obtain substantial revenues from
directly exploiting their patent portfolios. IBM, for example, earns literally billions of dollars
each year exploiting its patent portfolio, a significant share of that comes from its software
patents.153 Thus, although different firms have different strategies, for large firms the potential
does exist to earn substantial revenues from direct exploitation of patents. Although information
about the amount of those revenues would be valuable in assessing the net effect of patents,
information on that subject usually is considered proprietary and is not readily available.
C. Summary
Much remains unclear about the ability of patents to induce commercialization in the
software industry. For example, although the ability of small firms to use patents to protect
themselves is important, it is difficult to tell from the data available how widespread that benefit
is. If it is widespread, then it may contribute to the fragmented and highly competitive structure
of most sectors of the software industry by providing startups a sufficient time without
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That equilibrium may not be stable in the presence of trolls. Recent reports suggest that some
(but not all) of the large firms in the industry are engaged in a program to purchase patents that otherwise
might find their way into the hands of trolls. It appears that the large firms that declined to participate in
that program have reason to expect that they will be asked to pay royalties for using the technology
covered by the patents acquired in that process. Conversation with Pamela Samuelson (June 14, 2004).
153

See infra note 206 (discussing software patent licensing by IBM).
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competition to commercialize their products.154 Similarly, it is difficult to disentangle the local
effects that motivate firms to obtain patents – as cross-licensing collateral, for example – from
the direct effects and the information effects that might provide a justification for the system as a
whole. Further, any understanding of those effects must account for the differentiation of their
weight as firms progress through the development cycle. Finally, even if those effects elicit
funds for the firms that have patents,155 we cannot be sure that they increase total investment. It
is also possible that they simply alter the direction of investment towards patent-protected
investments without altering the total amount of investment.156 Another possibility is that larger
firms against whom the small firms’ patents are enforced would have invented the same products
almost as quickly.
To clarify the overall import of the discussion, Table One summarizes those effects. As
that table shows, my re search indicates a basic tradeoff between several effects that are not
readily quantifiable. The major burden I discern is the acquisition and use of patents for crosslicensing purposes, which seems to be a deadweight loss for the industry. On the other side are
three benefits. The first two largely accrue to smaller firms: the benefits patents provide in
sheltering smaller firms, and the information benefits to smaller firms. Both of those are
difficult to quantify: the first because it depends on an understanding of whether and to what
extent small firms invent that technology sooner than large firms would have invented it without
a patent system, and the second because it is almost inherently subjective. The third benefit is
the potential licensing revenues that accrue most commonly to IBM and other large firms. That
might not be difficult to quantify but, as discussed above, it is not something about which
quantitative data is easy to locate.
TABLE ONE
POSITIVE EFFECTS OF PATENTS

LITIGATION
RESOURCES
EXCLUSION BENEFITS
LICENSING
BENEFITS
CROSS-LICENSING
BENEFITS

PRE-REVENUE
STARTUPS
IMPRACTICAL
SCARCE

LATER-STAGE STARTUPS

LARGE FIRMS

USEFUL
AVAILABLE

UNNECESSARY
BOUNTIFUL

NONE

LARGE

MINIMAL

RARE

OCCASIONAL

VARIED

NONE

POTENTIAL

LARGE
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This effect resonates with the analysis in Arora & Merges 2004, suggesting that strong IP
rights facilitate organization of an industry with independent suppliers rather than integration into an
existing firm.
155

Bessen & Hunt 2003:19-20 finds no relation between patenting and the status of a firm as a
new entrant. Because their database involves large firms, however, and because my hypotheses suggest
that both new and old firms should have patents – albeit for different reasons – I do not think their
findings affect my analysis here.
156

Moser 2003 provides historical empirical evidence that supports that possibility.
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SIGNIFICANT

TRIVIAL

IV. Potential Costs of Patents in the Software Industry
A. Patent Thickets
The literature criticizing software patents generally does not discuss the issues related to
commercialization. Thus, it does not consider the possibility that the costs of stockpiling patents
for cross-licensing purposes exceed the net benefits that the system provides. Rather, it focuses
on a single potential problem: the costs that patents impose when they exclude third parties from
development. Most famously, Larry Lessig argues that the proliferation of software patents has
created an “anticommons” (a term Lessig draws from Michael Heller’s work with Becky
Eisenberg157) or a patent “thicket” (Carl Shapiro’s term158). This concern also is stated in Jim
Bessen’s work (by himself and with other co-authors).159 Specifically, the concern is that there
are so many overlapping patents in the industry that potential innovators cannot readily obtain
the approvals necessary to conduct their research.160 The thesis gains some credibility from the
nature of software innovation, because, as explained above, a software product might involve
dozens of innovations, and several firms might hold patents on one or more aspects of a firm’s
technology.
I address first the claim of Bessen and his co-authors that the proliferation of patents has
stifled R&D spending. I then address the anecdotal claim that a thicket of patent claims deters
small firms from pursuing promising innovations.
1. R&D Spending
The two papers are Bessen’s unpublished papers with Maskin on Sequential Innovation,
Patents, and Imitation and with Hunt on An Empirical Look at Software Patents. Bessen &

157

Heller & Eisenberg 1998. Formal economic modeling of this problem appears in Buchanan &
Yoon 2000; see also Parisi, DePoorter & Schulz 2000:17-18 (application of that model to intellectual
property).
158

I use the term from the extended discussion in Shapiro 2001. That discussion is considerably
more guarded. He simply notes the possibility of a thicket.
159

See Bessen 2003; Bessen & Hunt 2003; Bessen & Maskin 2002. Bessen’s relevant work is
unpublished. I respond to it here because it has been widely cited even in its unpublished form. {A
search on Westlaw in July of 2004 found 22 citations to Bessen & Maskin 2002.} Kingston and Kash
ultimately rest their criticisms on a similar concern, that large firms will “intimidate” outsiders and
prevent them from competing. Kingston & Kash 2001:16-17.
160

Heller & Eisenberg 1998 previously argued that a similar condition afflicts the biotech
industry. A contrary view is articulated forcefully by Walsh, Arora & Cohen 2002. For rebuttal, see Rai
& Eisenberg 2003.
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Maskin compare a dataset of software patents (defined by patent classes) held by large publicly
traded firms to R&D expenditures of those firms. They find a correlation between increases in
software patenting and declining R&D expenditures. The evidence, however, terminates in 1995
– a very early stage of the software industry – and includes only leading software patentees,
rather than leading firms in the industry. Thus, their dataset includes companies like Ford,
General Electric, and Japanese firms like Mitsubishi and Matsushita, but excludes companies
like Microsoft and Oracle (which were not large software patentees at that time).161
Furthermore, given the limited importance of software development to the firms that they
examine, it would seem important to determine the amount of R&D spending those firms
allocate to software development, which they are unable to do with Compustat data.
The more recent paper with Robert Hunt collects a dataset of patents based on key words
that are reasonably likely to reflect software innovation. This paper plainly reflects the most
serious effort to date to collect a dataset of software patents, as they have collected all patents
including the relevant key words from 1976 to 1999, about 131,000 patents.162 Most of the
patents in their dataset are assigned to large manufacturers. Software publishers own only five
percent of the patents in their dataset. Their dataset also excludes most private firms.163 Thus,
they do not analyze the firms that generate about one-third of the patents they collected from the
PTO database.164 The primary finding of this paper of relevance here is that the propensity to
patent has increased in the software industry since the late 1980’s.165 For the reasons discussed
in Part II, that finding is not surprising.166
Bessen & Hunt also analyze the relation between R&D spending and patenting,
concluding that patents are a substitute for R&D spending. Thus, they argue, R&D spending
would be higher if changes in the law had not made software patents more attractive.167 They
conclude that the results are attributable to strategic patenting in a small number of industries
that drive their results.168 Although the data is intriguing, and the analysis considerably more
robust than in the Bessen & Maskin paper, it suffers from a number of problems. For one thing,
it has several of the same design flaws as the Bessen & Maskin paper, because the focus of the

161

Bessen & Maskin 2002:16-20, 25.

162

Bessen & Hunt 2003:8-10. As they explain, the word-search methodology produces results
that are similar to, though slightly broader than, the methodology John Allison and I are using in our work
to identify software patents by direct examination of the patents.
163

Their sample starts with firms that were listed on CompuStat as of 1989, and is supplemented
by adding the 25 largest publicly traded software firms and an unspecified number of private firms based
on data provided by CHI. Bessen & Hunt 2003:12-13.
164

Bessen & Hunt 2003:13.

165

Bessen & Hunt 2003:21-22.

166

For a similar result using a dataset that focuses on the software industry, see Graham &
Mowery 2002.
167

Bessen & Hunt 2003:27-34.

168

Bessen & Hunt 2003:38-40.
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paper is not on the software industry, but rather on software patents. As Bessen & Hunt
emphasize, “software patenting [as they define it] by and large has little to do with the prepackaged software industry.”169 Rather, their emphasis is on the other industries in which many
software patents are held.170 Second, as in the earlier paper, the analysis relates firm-wide R&D
expenditures – whether or not related to software – to software patents. It is of course possible
that software patents have such strong effects that their potential availability might alter the
overall R&D expenditures of companies like Ford, but it does seem unlikely. Even for a firm
like IBM – which devotes a huge amount of resources to software R&D – the number of
considerations that might influence total R&D spending that are completely divorced from the
software market substantially undermines the credibility of the findings.171 More broadly,
Robert Hahn & Scott Wallsten have identified a number of technical problems with the statistical
analysis, which suggest that their core finding that R&D funding and software patents are
substitutes is not reliable.172
Against those studies – suggesting a puzzling relation between software patents and
overall R&D outside the software industry – we can examine data that directly describe the
current state of R&D in the software industry. That data suggests a different picture, one in
which software R&D is impressively robust. For example, Technology Review's Corporate R&D
Scorecards report the annual research and development spending of the world’s top 150
technology companies. Each company is assigned to one of 12 sectors based on its primary
business. The scorecard figures are derived from annual reports and U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission filings. Data from the Scorecards indicates that R&D spending for the
software industry is higher than in similar high-tech industries. For example, R&D spending as a
percentage of revenues in the software industry for 2002 was 14.5.173 By way of comparison,
R&D spending in the same period was 6.7% for computer hardware, 7.4% for
electrical/electronics, and 8.1% for telecommunications. Thus, for the top technology
companies, the R&D intensity ratios are high in the software industry in comparison to other
industries.174 National Science Foundation data regarding industrial R&D intensity provides a

169

Bessen & Hunt 2003:38.

170

Even in the industries for which they identify an effect, the effects are driven by the behavior
of a small number of firms. For example, they find a significant effect in the two-digit SIC code 73
(which would include much of the software industry), but acknowledge that the result would disappear if
IBM’s data were removed. Bessen & Hunt 34 n.40.
171

Among other things, see Etro 2004 (arguing that parties with monopoly power in industries
with sequential innovation may have a greater incentive to invest heavily in R&D than outsiders in the
industry).
172

Hahn & Wallsten 2003.

173

It was 14% in 2001 and 14.5% in 2000. This figure seems to have been quite stable over time.
Prominent industry estimates in the early 1980’s suggested that the costs of “program development” were
at that time about 15% of revenues. CAMPBELL-KELLY 2003:211.
174

Examples from other countries do not seem to be useful. For example, the software industry
in Europe – where patent protection is considerably more ambiguous than it is here – is strikingly
underdeveloped compared to the United States. However, it is plain that the relative levels of

31

32

Software Patents

July 27, 2004 Draft

similar picture. That data shows that R&D intensity for firms in the software industry (NAICS
code 5112) was 19.3%, 20.0%, 16.8% and 20.5%, for the years 1997-2000, respectively, far
above the average in all industrial R&D firms of about 3.6%.175 Indeed, according to the
National Science Foundation, the software industry for the past four years has had an R&D
intensity substantially higher than any industry other than Scientific R&D Services (NAICS code
5417). Because software development does not depend heavily on the existence of
manufacturing facilities and other fixed assets, those high figures should not be surprising.
However, it is hard to credit the argument that R&D spending in the industry is systemically
depressed.
As this data shows, software R&D spending tends to be relatively stable over time as a
percentage of sales. Indeed, the most significant variable in R&D spending within the industry
appears to be company size. For example data from CompuStat indicates that median R&D
spending for large public companies (over $100 million in sales) in SIC 7372 (prepackaged
software) is only 15.9% of net sales, while mid-sized firms (between $30 million and $100
million) spent 22.6%, and small firms (under $30 million) spent 32.8%. Those figures have not
changed substantially over the last three years.176 The Software 500 provides similar statistics
for the 500 largest firms in the industry (including both public and private firms). For 2001,
firms with more than $100 million in sales had an average R&D intensity ratio of 12.83%177;
firms with sales between $30 and $100 million had an R&D intensity of 20.49%; and firms with
less than $30 million in sales had an R&D intensity of 23.89%. If, patents facilitate a fragmented
industry structure by sheltering small firms, they may help to support the high level of R&D
spending characteristic of those firms.178
The questions that Bessen, Maskin and Hunt raise would be answered best by looking at
patenting practices and R&D spending in the software industry. That work, however, is beyond
the scope of this paper. For now, perhaps the most that can be said with clarity is the basic point
with which I began this section: the patent system is not systematically preventing the initiation
of product development. Beyond that, it is plain that the system is functional. In the world that

development can be attributed to historical factors that have little to do with patent protection. See
CAMPBELL-KELLY 2003; Mowery (in MOWERY & NELSON 1999).
175

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION/DIVISION OF SCIENCE RESOURCE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF
INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: 2000.
176

2001: 16.5%, 26.9, 41.7; 2000: 15.9%, 28.0, 52.4; 1999: 15.1%, 20.0, 41.4. R&D intensity is
much higher in SIC 7372 than in the rest of the 7370s (at least for larger firms). The average R&D
intensity of the other firms in the 7370 series (in 2002) was 7.10% for large firms, 13.5% for medium
firms and 34% for small firms. The average R&D intensity in the 7370 series as a whole was 9.2% for
large firms, 17.7% for medium firms, and 38.5% for small firms.
177

IBM’s R&D intensity is far below the industry average (6% in 2001, 5.8% in 2000, and 6% in
1999), although it amounts to over 5 billion dollars each year, while Microsoft’s is considerably above the
average: 17% in 2001, 16.3% in 2000, 15% in 1999 (about $3.8 billion each year).
178

I do not mean to suggest here that higher R&D spending is optimal. It is of course possible
that R&D spending in the software industry is higher than the optimal level. I only mean to rebut the idea
that the proliferation of software patents has stifled R&D spending in any measurable way.
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we have – with patents – there are literally hundreds of small firms using institutional financing
to develop new technologies. The smaller firms are spending relatively more on R&D than the
bigger firms. It is as difficult to be sure that all of those firms would exist if there were no patent
protection as it is to be sure that there would not be even more firms if there were no patent
protection.
2. Stifling Small Firms
Turning from the empirical evidence about R&D spending to the more fundamental
question of industry practice, my interviews and the publicly available information I have located
about the industry make it difficult to credit the idea of a “thicket” or “anticommons” in the
software industry.179 When raised in my interviews, that thesis universally was rejected.180 The
premise of the model is that assets will go unused because of the costs of obtaining the
permissions necessary to use them.181 There is of course nothing theoretically impossible about
that outcome. The important question, however, is whether this is in fact what has happened in
the software industry.
In this case, a few objective indicators suggest reasons why the thesis of the patent thicket
has so little ability to say anything descriptive about the industry. For one thing, none of the
startup firms to which I spoke suggested a practice of doing prior-art searches before beginning
development of their products.182 As far as I can tell, the only occasion in the software industry
in which a startup is likely to experience such costs is when the startup is founded on a specific
piece of existing technology spun off from an existing company or from a university laboratory.
For another thing, no investor suggested any concern about the possibility that their
portfolio firms might be infringing the IP of others in the industry. That is not because they were
sure that the startups were not infringing; it was because they thought it would be unlikely to

179

My reactions are based on the history and practices of the software industry. More generally,
Rob Merges has long championed the idea that contracting practices often will ensure the effective
dissemination of IP throughout an industry. E.g., Merges 1996; Merges 2001:140-46. His current project
extends that line of reasoning to private investments in the public domain. He contends that those
investments have the potential to limit potential costs from “overpropertization,” particularly in the
software industry. Merges 2004.
180

See, e.g., Abbott Interview:6; Beauchamp Interview:6; Eggleston Interview:6; Subhedar
Interview:3; Treybig Interview:8; Weghorst Interview:6.
181

See, e.g., Buchanan & Yoon 2000:4. At its core, the thicket analysis is an analogy to a postGorbachev apartment in Moscow that would sit vacant because of the inability of any particular user to
obtain consents from all of the various parties with interests in the apartment.
182

See Harlan Interview; Hill Interview: Thomas Interview:1; Urdahl Interview; Witek Interview.
Mark Lemley points out that startup firms have a strong incentive not to do such searches, both because
the results must be included in later patent applications and because they can affect the determination of
willfulness in later litigation. Lemley & Tangri 2003; FTC REPORT:49-50. Conversations with industry
professionals suggest that this explanation is consistent with industry practice and with the advice that
leading law firms provide their clients.
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pose a significant difficulty if they were. As discussed above, industry executives do accept one
premise of the patent-thicket thesis: that software patents are multiplying so rapidly that it is
likely that many products startups are developing ultimately will infringe patents held by large
existing companies. The textbook example is IBM, which apparently holds far more software
patents than any other company in the industry. Indeed, as I explained above, several of my
interview subjects joked that they thought it likely – without any investigation or particular
knowledge – thattheir product would infringe something in IBM’s portfolio.
Yet that posed no significant concern for those firms. It is perhaps an artifact of the
particular history of the industry, but IBM has firmly set a course of relatively lenient
enforcement of its IP rights. The lenience of its practices is attributed to an attitude developed
during its long subjection to government antitrust scrutiny, an attitude of wishing to refrain from
conduct that would be likely to interest federal antitrust regulators in its practices.183 It is now a
circumstance long forgotten by many (as IBM is regarded most prominently as a dominant
hardware manufacturer), but there was a time when IBM’s dominance in the software market
was as complete as any dominance it ever has had in the hardware market. Indeed, the most
authoritative history marks the beginning of the commercial software industry as the date when
IBM began to sell its proprietary software unbundled from its hardware products.184 If the
antitrust litigation tempered IBM’s willingness to press its advantages to their fullest, it has
limited the rise of a patent thicket in the industry.
IBM’s relative lenience also is attributed to the asymmetric risks IBM faces from patent
litigation. As the ongoing SCO litigation demonstrates, a finding that IBM’s widely distributed
products infringe a valid patent is likely to cost IBM much more than a finding of infringement
by a small party with a limited customer base that might be involved in litigation with IBM.185
That is not to say that IBM allows people to use its IP freely.186 It is to say, however, that
licenses to use its IP are freely available to all legitimate users.187 Indeed, it appears that the
principal, if not the only, reason that IBM would be unwilling to grant a license to use its patents
would be if the party requesting the license refused to grant IBM parallel access to the party’s
own IP.188 Thus, IBM has followed a consistent two-pronged strategy: attempting to gain as

183

See Crouse Interview:3 (discussing history of IBM’s patent licensing practices); Dinkin
Interview:5-6.
184

CAMPBELL-KELLY 2003:109-10.

185

See Dinkin Interview:8.

186

For discussion of the profitability of the licensing to IBM, see GERSTNER 2002:146-52.

187

IBM’s Web site reports that it “is generally willing to grant nonexclusive licenses under
reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions to those who in turn, respect IBM's intellectual
property (IP) rights.”
See IBM Worldwide Patent Licensing Practices, available at
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/practices.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2003); ARORA, FOSFURI &
GAMBARDELLA 2001:235-36 (discussing requirements imposed on IBM by consent decrees in antitrust
litigation with the United States); CHANDLER 2001:250 (same).
188

IBM’s Web site reports only that it “includes in the terms and conditions of a license an option
for a comparable license-back of the licensee’s patents under similar terms and conditions,” and that “[i]n
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much access as it can to all IP in the industry (giving IBM the freedom to market and sell as
freely as possible),189 and at the same time generating a steady stream of revenues from its now
massive software-patent portfolio.190 As Rosemarie Ziedonis has shown, this strategy of heavy
patenting is common for large firms like IBM in an environment characterized by fractionation
of technology.191
The focus on freedom of action is a rational strategy for a large firm like IBM.
Considering its advantages in prestige, resources, marketing, and other forms of infrastructure, it
is reasonable for IBM to conclude that it can succeed in the marketplace without using the
relatively ineffective tool of IP to appropriate the value of its inventions. Thus, the principal
relevance of IP to IBM is to ensure that it is able to commercialize whatever products it desires.
If the patent portfolio that it uses to ensure that freedom also happens to generate substantial
revenues, that is a useful thing, but not nearly so central to the firm’s core strategy.
Nor is this strategy unique to IBM. Microsoft, for example, has an impressively large
portfolio, but does not appear to enforce it aggressively. Its recent adoption of an open licensing
policy that resembles IBM’s policy192 suggests at least an implicit acknowledgment that IBM has
discerned the correct strategy. There of course is the possibility that Microsoft’s current strategy
is motivated as much by its experience with antitrust litigation as IBM’s. Finally, other large
firms that I interviewed in related industries suggested that their IP strategies were similar.193
The noted194 paper by James Bessen and Eric Maskin articulates a contrary view,
reasoning that sequential innovation in an industry with complementarity of inventions is likely
to lead to an anticommons.195 The paper is flawed by its central logical step: reasoning from the
wide dispersion of IP rights to the conclusion that IP is not generally available to firms in the
industry. The paper does not account for the literature indicating that the effectiveness of

cases where a licensing partner has a significant patent portfolio, IBM will consider a patent cross
license.”
See
IBM
Worldwide
Patent
Licensing
Practices,
available
at
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/practices.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
189

See Treybig Interview:5 (“IBM[’s strategy] is to keep anybody with a patent from hindering
what they want to do. * * * * The role of patents was to protect the company against innovation so the
company could not be stopped from doing anything it wanted.”).
190

IBM’s Web site reports a standard fee of 1% of the “selling price” for use of a single patent in
a product, with a maximum fee of 5%. See IBM Worldwide Patent Licensing Practices, available at
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/practices.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
191

Ziedonis 2004.

192

http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2003/dec03/12-03ExpandIPPR.asp (last visited
Dec. 15, 2003).
193

I had two such interviews with representatives of Fortune 500 technology firms. Both
requested anonymity with respect to that discussion.
194

As discussed above, the paper is the principal empirical support that Lessig offers for his
discussion of the subject.
195

Bessen & Maskin 2002.
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licensing will depend to a great degree on context.196 Rather, the paper rests on the explicit
assumption that firms will not be able to reach value-increasing licensing agreements to make
technology widely available in the industry.197
To the extent that the literature supports any theoretical conclusions that are independent
of historical context, Merges & Nelson argue that a positive outcome is particularly likely – as in
the software industry – in cases in which there is not a single pioneering patent or group of
patents that gives one firm control.198 The numerous sectors into which the software industry is
divided have made it difficult for any single patent or group of patents to control a major part of
the whole industry.199
James Bessen’s recent paper articulates a more complex model of the same problem. He
recognizes the possibility that optimal incentives for research and development can occur when
firms develop a culture of “mutual non-aggression.”200 He argues, however, that “aggressive”
cross-licensing is a distinct pattern that is likely to lead to sub-optimal incentives for innovation
in industries in which patent standards are too low, particularly in cases in which mature
incumbents populate the industry.201 Whatever the merits of that analysis, there is little reason to
think that it is applicable to the software industry. As discussed above, it is clear that the
licensing culture in the industry depends to a considerable degree on the practices of the
industry’s leader. In addition, it is clear that IBM has determined for reasons of its own –
influenced to be sure by federal antitrust enforcement202 – that it should refrain from pressing its
patent portfolio aggressively. Thus, although it is always possible to imagine that aggressive
practices could lead to sub-optimal innovations,203 the historical events that have made IBM and
196

See, e.g., Cohen, Nelson & Walsh 2000:25-29; Lemley 1997:1061-67; Merges & Nelson
1990:894-97, 908; Merges & Nelson 1994:13-16; Scotchmer 1991:33-34.
197

Bessen & Maskin 2002:5.

198

See Merges & Nelson 1990:908-11; Merges & Nelson 1994:4-5.

199

Nevertheless, there certainly have been important patents that have allowed a single firm to
dominate a particular sector for a while. The Rambus patent is the most common example mentioned in
my interviews. Urdahl Interview. Interestingly enough, the interviews suggest that the need to patent is
particularly high in sectors dominated by such a patent, apparently out of a desire to obtain collateral for
cross licensing. Urdahl Interview. It is possible that much of the sectoral variation that appears in my
related empirical study is attributable to such historical artifacts. However, for the present purpose the
key point is that dominance of a single sector for a time is far from dominance of the entire industry.
Moreover, that kind of patent-based dominance has never occurred in favor of an incumbent like IBM or
Microsoft. Thus, those patents are much less troublesome than, for example, the Edison light bulb patent
that Merges & Nelson discuss. Merges & Nelson 1990; Merges & Nelson 1994.
200

Bessen 2003.

201

Bessen 2003:14-15.

202

See supra note 187.

203

The possibility that a disadvantageous structure could have developed doubtless explains
much of the fears of software patents expressed in the early days of the industry. See LESSIG 2001
(discussing such fears); Fox & Kelley 2002 (in FROM IDEAS TO ASSETS):193-94 (discussing those fears,
and how they have dissipated with actual experience in the industry). A number of public statements on
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now Microsoft as cautious as they are make it difficult to argue that those patterns have
emerged,204 whatever might happen in the future.205
What this means for purposes of this discussion is that innovators know that IBM and
Microsoft hold large number of patents and that they are likely to use those patents to seek some
share of revenues from any major new product. There is, of course, nothing wrong with that.
IBM does spend billions of dollars each year on research and development related to the
software technology on which it receives patents. It is not alone in that practice.206 The fact that
it can earn royalties from those patents through freely licensing them to all comers does not
suggest a patent thicket. On the contrary, a patent thicket would exist only if industry-licensing
practices were such that firms in the industry commonly were unable to agree on terms for
licenses and thus retreated from the field of innovation. That is not a realistic portrait of the
commercial software industry, as it now exists.
Another more plausible possibility is that the “tax” on innovation created by crosslicensing fees is detrimental to innovation in the industry. From this perspective, it is not that the
existing patents are so widely distributed as to make it impossible for firms to obtain access to
the technology, it is just that the cost of paying for access to that technology lowers the return on
investment in the industry to the point that investments in innovation are less than they would be
without patents. Part of the difficulty in assessing that possibility is the intractability of
determining whether a typical 5% license fee is a sufficient drag on a small firm’s profitability to
amount to a substantial burden. The problem would be more severe if firms often had to pay
multiple licensing fees, but that seems uncommon based on the interviews that I have conducted.

that point were delivered in a 1994 Department of Commerce hearing in San Jose, at which several firms
(including Adobe, Borland, and Oracle) argued against software patents, while several others argued in
their favor (including IBM, Intel, and Microsoft).
The statements are available at
http://lpf.ai.mit.edu/Patents/testimony/statements/.
204

For a typical news story, see Patents: A Necessary Evil 2002, available at
http://news.com.com/2009-1001-801896.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (discussing IBM licenses that
permitted development of technologies for DVD, PalmPilot, Handspring, and TIVO).
205

As I suggest supra note 152, there is some possibility that the equilibrium I describe here may
change in the future. It remains to be seen, however, whether it will alter the basic pattern, in which the
smallest startups are left relatively free to develop their products without constraints from the patent
portfolios of large firms.
206

See also Crouse Interview (suggesting that the ability to generate patent royalties from
Microsoft’s research department helped justify that section’s budget allocations). It is difficult to get
details about revenues from software patents, but overall patent licensing revenues have risen from less
than $20 billion in 1990 to well over $100 billion by 2000. RIVETTE & KLINE:6. At IBM alone, IP
licensing revenues were more than $500 million in 2002. IBM does not report separately the figures for
software-patent licensing, but it has reported that about a third of the patents it has received in the last
decade (7,500 out of 2,500) and the last year (12,50 out of 3,300) are software patents (IBM Tops U.S.
Patent
List
(Jan.
13,
2003),
available
at
http://www3.ibm.com/software/swnews/swnews.nsf/n/mmaa5hrqgp?OpenDocument&Site=default (last visited Oct.
7, 2003), so it is reasonable to estimate that its software-related patent licensing revenues are in the range
of $150-$200 million a year.
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In the end, my instinct is that it is not a substantial burden. I am driven particularly by the point
that the licensing fees normally are paid only on revenues – not simply on use of the patented
technology – and thus impose no costs on firms that are in a pre-revenue development stage.
B. Patents and Open Source Development
In my mind, the biggest question about the effectiveness of software patents relates to the
interrelation between commercial software development (the topic of this paper) and open source
development. This paper relates almost entirely to the commercial software industry, where
software is developed and commercialized in an institutional way. My evidence suggests that
within that framework patents are useful, largely because they offer more benefits than costs to
small firms. However, coexisting with the commercial software industry is a large and
apparently growing open source community, which develops software largely without
commercial investment or affirmative IP protections.207 Those who work in that community may
have little need for patents. The cooperative nature of development obviates any need for the
actual and implicit cross licensing that disseminates access to technology throughout the
commercial software sector. Similarly, because open source developers do not depend on
outside equity investment to any significant degree, the limited ability to appropriate a software
invention poses little harm to them.
The problem, however, is that the open source community does not exist in a vacuum. It
exists in a world in which the commercial software industry is building up large portfolios of
protected IP, portfolios that pose a serious threat to open source development. To put the matter
in a current context, suppose for a moment that the Linux operating system in fact infringes in a
substantial way patents held by some major proprietary software firm. That could result in
liability for all of the many firms using the Linux operating system. The problem is that the open
source community has set itself outside of the cooperative IP framework of the mainstream
software industry. Thus, its members often have no patents of their own with which they might
protect themselves in such litigation. At the same time, this community has developed its
software with the same cavalier attitude to the possibility of patent infringement as commercial
software firms exemplify. Those two habits cannot coexist in the end.
That raises the question, in turn, whether the potential for high-quality software
development through the open source modeljustifies eradication of software patents even for the
commercial software industry. To put it another way, one potential cost of permitting ready
enforcement of software patents is the potential disabling of the open source model.208 It is
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The literature on that subject is large and contentious. The classic source is Raymond 1998.
For a lucid, accessible, and reasonably balanced introduction, see FINK 2002.
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Zittrain 2004 discusses the difficulties that the open source movement faces in responding to
attacks from proprietary firms (like the SCO litigation) alleging that open source code has been
contaminated by copying proprietary software code. My point here is a more systemic one that cannot be
avoided even by thorough review of code incorporated into an open source project: the open source
project would infringe the patent even if the open source code were created independently, without any
knowledge of the patented technology.
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difficult to answer that question definitively without evidence that would allow a comparative
weighing of the benefits of open source development against the benefits that the commercial
software industry derives from IP. It does seem relevant, however, that the reluctance of the
open source community to obtain patents is largely a political statement, not something
necessary to the development of the improvements in functionality that the open source
movement promises.209 Indeed, the prominent use of the copyleft technique is a direct rejection
of the notion that software technology should be free from constraints imposed by its creator.210
This is proven most clearly by the recent applications for patents filed by noted Linux distributor
Red Hat.211 To the extent the open source community is put at risk by the proprietary
community solely because of moral distaste for patents, the claim that the proprietary community
should not be able to use patents to advantage its own operations is weakened.
In any event, a thorough analysis of that question is beyond the scope of this paper.
Among other things, such an analysis would have to account for the rapid convergence of
commercial and open source licensing models – so that even proprietary licenses now commonly
allow access to source code and purportedly open source licenses regularly permit commercial
development of proprietary works derived from the covered products.212 I note the issue here
only to define the bounds of my analysis. The primary goal of this paper is to consider the role
of IP in the commercial software industry.
V. The Role of Other Existing Systems
If the ultimate question is whether patents facilitate the ability of software firms to
appropriate the gains from innovation, the picture must include some understanding of the
alternate methods that firms might use to appropriate the value of inventions. Those alternate
methods are particularly important given the clear evidence that in many circumstances patents
will do little to allow a firm to exclude competitors from a firm’s innovation. This Part discusses
the two main existing legal systems that complement the protections afforded by patents:
copyright and trade secrets.
A. Copyright
Like patent protection, the role of copyright protection changes markedly as the firm
develops. My interviews suggest that copyright is of relatively little value in protecting the
startup from competitors. It does have value, however, in two particular circumstances:
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For a clear discussion of the distinction between the moral and pragmatic segments of the open
source community, see Zittrain 2004. Merges 2004 views investments in open source development as an
example of property-preempting investments – investments designed to create a field of innovation from
which IP exclusivity will be absent.
210

See McGowan 2001; Zittrain 2004.
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Broersma 2002.
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See MANN & WINN 2005 (discussing those developments).
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preventing piracy at a company’s later stage when it has developed a product; and preventing
“theft” of materials by outgoing employees.
1. The Role of Copyright in Startups
For purposes of this paper, the key question is the extent to which copyright protection
can provide the kind of sustainable differentiation that is important to investors. The preceding
Parts display considerable ambiguity on the ability of patents to provide that differentiation.
With respect to copyright, however, the question is much less ambiguous. Rather, it seems quite
clear that copyright is not suited to providing that protection. The problem with copyright
protection for software is that the legal system for copyright is not designed to protect
functionality. Because functionality in most cases is the aspect of software products that makes
them attractive to customers,213 the differentiation that is important to investors is differentiation
in functionality. Thus, if the legal system works as designed, copyright should be useless at this
point.
My interviews strongly supported that perspective. For example, a typical startup
executive explained that copyright protection “is not useful to us [because of its inability to
protect functionality]. The other person could do just the same thing in a different manner and
get around it very easily.”214 Another argued: “I’ve been in the software business for 20 years.
Copyrights are worthless. They are totally worthless.”215 One thoughtful executive opined:
Copyright solves one problem, which is the whole or partial copying of an
expressive application. The whole or partial copying of an application by a pirate
you can get. But it doesn’t really protect us from sharing our technical
information broadly and a company then understanding how our products work.

213

There are, of course, types of software for which functionality is not of central importance.
Video games, for example, are software products for which the expressive content is the primary market
differentiator. What that means for my purposes is that the relevant IP protections for video games
should look much more like those for traditional audiovisual works (such as motion pictures).
Knowledgeable industry executives recognize this distinction as crucial in the negotiation of contracts
related to the exploitation of those works. See Koontz Interview:1.
214

Harding Interview:1; see Beauchamp Interview:8 (“To what extent does [copyright] keep
people from stealing your ideas or your product? None.”); Costello Interview:1 (“Generally, I think that
most people in the software industry don’t think it is worth all that much.”); Kalinoski Interview:8) (“I’ve
seen enough of copyright litigation and the issues with copyright law that don’t have any real bite. They
don’t have – * * * there is no impact. * * * [P]eople think that by having copyright * * * that no one can
really copy things * * * and it just doesn’t stand up in the marketplace.”); Kelley Interview:1 (“What
really it does come down to is what is the thing that is marketable and if this thing that is particularly
marketable is functionality, then the patent is clearly playing a more important role.”). For similar
comments from venture-capital investors, see E. Jones Interview:2 (“We don’t make copyright a big
issue.”); Lee Interview:1 (copyright is “not a focus area for us” because it is “not useful”); Murphree
Interview:1.
215

Adams Interview:1.
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Patents are inter-industry mechanisms for creating value. Copyright is creating
protection between the industry and the channel or end customers.216
The most obvious problem with that argument relates to reverse engineering.217
Generally, the expression that copyright protects in computer software is in the lines of code of
which the program consists.218 Thus, although copyright does not prohibit a competitor from
writing a completely new program that includes the functionality of the existing program, it does
bar a competitor from taking the existing code to produce that program.219 Thus, the effect of
that protection turns on an empirical question: how effective as an exclusionary device is it to
require a competitor to rewrite a competing program instead of reusing the code?
Surprisingly, my interviews indicate quite strongly that it is not effective. The perception
is that in most instances a software engineer that could observe the program in operation could
readily understand the functionality that the software provides and with that understanding easily
could write code that would provide the same functionality: “[S]oftware in general is very
malleable and is easily reverse engineered.”220 As one venture investor explained: “The
216

Kaefer Interview:2. For a similar emphasis on the vertical – rather than horizontal – value of
copyright protection, see D’Eath Interview:6 (“If somebody goes and takes the actual code that is a pretty
stupid way of competing. No valid competitor is going to just take the product and steal the code.”). As I
discuss below (Section V(A)(2)(a)), copyright’s role in preventing piracy is arguably its most important
role in the software context.
217

There is a terminological complication in the discussion that follows. To some, “reverse
engineering” has a narrow meaning that implies an effort to duplicate existing source code precisely. See,
e.g., infra note 220 (discussing sources that take that perspective). In most of my interviews, however, it
was plain in context that “reverse engineering” referred more broadly to an effort to recreate functionality,
without regard to recreating existing source code.
218

See, e.g., Karjala 1997:72-77. There also of course is a literary work protected by copyright in
the interfaces through which users interact with programs. And in some cases at least, as with the video
games discussed above, it is plausible to think that the interface itself could be important to the market
success of the product. To the extent that is true, copyright protection for the interface (which is
relatively thin for the reasons discussed above) would have the potential to exclude competitors by
making reverse engineering illegal. As the text suggests, that seems to me an inappropriate application of
copyright doctrine. See Karjala 1997:75-77, 94-112 (arguing that copyright protection does not extend to
software interfaces).
219

See, e.g., Karjala 1997:72-75.

220

Weghorst Interview:3. This is consistent with the understanding of Pamela Samuelson and her
co-authors (including the noted software engineer Mitchell Kapor), who contend that the know-how of
software is for the most part “near the surface” and readily extractible through testing. Samuelson, Davis,
Kapor & Reichman 1994:2317-20 (arguing that programs with different code but identical behavior are
market substitutes). But cf. Abramson 2002:128 (expressing doubt about utility of “black-box testing”);
Strasser 2001:23 (similar perspective). Abramson and Strasser address reverse engineering designed to
recreate the existing source code. I share their view that it would be difficult to do that. As the text and
Samuelson’s discussion recognize, however, it is clear that the goal of the typical reverse engineering
process is not to reproduce the existing source code as much as to understand and reproduce the
functionality that the source code effects. See supra note 217. I see no reason to doubt the value of
“black-box testing” for that task.
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difficulty normally is managing the people, not solving the problem. The code won’t look the
same, but the functionality will.”221 One developer explained that the difficulty in coming up
with a successful enterprise software product is not writing the code, but understanding the
problem that needs to be solved.222 Thus, the only IP protection that would make it difficult to
duplicate a program’s functionality would be patent protection – which would bar a competitor
from writing code that includes any patented aspects of the software’s functionality. If copyright
systematically stops short of providing that protection, it cannot provide the vehicle for
appropriating value that would persuade potential investors.
2. The Role of Copyright in Later-Stage Firms
Yet, it is plain that copyright plays a crucial role in the industry’s ability to appropriate
returns from the innovation that it produces. That role has several aspects, but two are
sufficiently pervasive that they can be characterized as structural: the prevention of piracy and
the control of “theft” of code by departing employees and the like.223
(a) Piracy
On the first point, the discussion above explains that copyright protection is unimportant
for the startup firm because literal copying of the code is not that important to the competitors of
the startup. There is one group, however, that would be quite interested in a free right to copy

221

Lee Interview:1; see Murphree Interview:1; Stephenson Interview:1 (“Copyright only protects
the particular source code, the instantiation, the physical lines of code that you wrote. And in software
there are a number of different ways to accomplish the same thing.”); id. (“And plus, the bigger point is
that all you really get is protection on that particular instantiation. If they change * * * and they’re not
violating that copyright, then it’s not really doing that much good. Because ultimately what you want to
protect is the functionality.”). For similar views from developers see Bishop Interview:2 (arguing that
reverse engineering is easy when the ideas in a product are “what the customer wants”; Like [graphic user
interfaces], once you know that’s what people want, easy to do.”); Costello Interview:1 (“[T]he general
problem [with copyright protection] is there are a million ways to go around it. And I think that is true
for almost all IP in software.”); Kalinoski Interview:9 ([Your competitors a]re at least smart enough to go
modify and have something that’s VERY * * * similar. It’s got the same attributes. It’s got a lot of the
same qualities, but it looks just a little bit [different even if] it’s obvious where they got all of their
thinking.”); Rightmer Interview:2) (“Reverse engineering is easy. Copyright protects only against blatant
theft. Ever since Lotus lost protection for look and feel, copyright has not seemed valuable in the
industry. We do this all the time for our customers, to mimic the functionality, input, and output of
existing products that we are replacing.”).
222

Weghorst Interview:4 (“[T]ypically, when you’re talking about enterprise software, * * * the
magic dust, if you will, is in the domain expertise [of] knowing that we need to solve the problems that
we needed to solve.”).
223

Data from the Northern District of California for 2002 show that 27 out of the 90 copyright
cases filed involved software. Of the 22 software-copyright cases for which I could obtain a complaint,
the majority (15) involved claims of unauthorized distribution of the copyright owner’s product. Four
involved claims against competitors for wrongful reverse engineering, and three arose out of contract
disputes between web-site developers and their customers.
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the startup’s product: its customers. Thus, where patent and trade secret protection are more
important in limiting the ability of competitors – horizontal firms – to take technology from the
innovator, copyright is more important in limiting the ability of customers to obtain the product
without paying the product’s owner.224
That problem – piracy, to use the industry’s preferred term – affects different types of
software differently. For example, it is less important in the enterprise software market in this
country. To be sure, there are reliable methods of limiting piracy in that market. In some cases,
firms operate as application service providers, so that the code for their program resides entirely
on their own server, which can be protected more readily than the servers of their customers
can.225 Other companies, particularly in the enterprise software sector that is the source of most
innovation in the industry, emphasized the practical value of dealing only with large and fiscally
responsible “Fortune 500” customers.226 A typical example: “[W]e’re selling to an enterprise
customer. We’re not on a store shelf. So I’m not at risk of somebody copying the disk and just
cloning what I do.”227 Key to the effectiveness of those arrangements is the likelihood that the
customers will be large and creditworthy firms. Those types of firms are unlikely to participate
in illicit distribution of software code, if only because of the likely financial exposure they would
incur if their participation were discovered.
In some markets, however, those protections are not useful. Most obviously, they are not
valuable in markets (such as consumer markets) in which software code (in any form) is freely
distributed.228 Even in this country, it is apparent that consumers commonly violate the terms of
license agreements, copying and transferring software in ways that would require payment from
the new user.
Executives recognize that in other countries the problem is a serious one even in the
enterprise software context.229 For reasons that range from an intentional governmental design to
foster piracy to mere lackadaisical toleration of piracy, the extent of piracy in many foreign
countries is shocking: industry statistics indicate that in many countries less than 20% of the
224

See supra note 216 and accompanying text (articulating a distinction between vertical and
horizontal protection).
225

See Harding Interview:2.

226

See Bishop Interview:3; D’Eath Interview4; Rightmer Interview:2.

227

D’Eath Interview:6.

228

See D’Eath Interview:7 (“That answer is going to be very different for somebody who is
selling a retail product.”); Kelley Interview:2 (emphasizing importance of copyright protection for massmarket software); see also Karjala 1997:67 (“[O]nce * * * programs are distributed in object-code form,
they can be copied almost without cost in large numbers.”).
229

See Adams Interview:1 (discussing piracy of Lotus in Italy); Cranton Interview:1; D’Eath
Interview:7 (“Because [if you sell overseas] you then in fact could have somebody just copying it, in
France or Germany or somewhere where they’re not watching.”); Levins Interview:1) (discussing major
businesses engaged in piracy in Eastern Europe); Sikora Interview:1 (offering examples of Russia and
China); see also Cranton Interview:2 (suggesting that enforcement of copyright protection over the
Internet is similar to enforcement in a developing country).
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software actually distributed is accomplished through lawful channels.230 To be sure, the piracy
in those countries is not a total loss to the software developer, because it helps to develop a
network of users that make the product more attractive to others. Still, it does reflect a loss of
revenue that the software developer could obtain if its IP rights were enforced effectively.
For several reasons, copyright is the only effective IP protection against piracy.231 For
example, even if the pirated software were protected in part by a patent, a suit against the pirate
challenging patent infringement necessarily would be more difficult, because of the need for the
software owner to establish the validity of the patent. Because of the high standard of
patentability, it always will be difficult for the patent owner to get over the threshold of
patentability.232 Because of the low threshold of copyrightability, it never will be difficult for the
owner of copyrighted software to establish that the software includes copyrightable
innovation.233 In addition, the limitations on copyright protection discussed above – which make
copyright useless for the startup trying to protect the functionality of its software – will be
irrelevant in the case of the pirate: the pirate by definition will have copied all or substantially all
of the product. Those problems are particularly important in the enforcement of criminal
sanctions for piracy. Statistics from the Department of Justice suggest that the federal
government often sues pirates for criminal copyright infringement; there is not a statute for
criminal patent infringement.234

230

See IDC 2003 (reporting piracy rates of 94% for Vietnam, 92% for China, 88% for Indonesia,
and 87% for Russia and for Ukraine). Nor is the problem limited to Asia and the former Soviet Union.
The IDC data suggest that piracy also is rampant in countries in Europe (Bulgaria and Romania 75%,
Croatia 67%, Greece 64%), the Middle East (Kuwait 76%), and Latin America (Costa Rice 64% and
Argentina 62%).
231

See Crouse Interview:1 (“[C]opyright remains incredibly important for us [at Microsoft].
Without that piracy on a worldwide basis as a form of competition – it would be hard for people to sustain
a business against.”); Karjala:1997:67 (“Because the evil to be avoided was * * * slavish copying,
especially slavish electronic copying, because copyright protects at least against that, and because
computer programs formally fit the broad definition of a literary work under copyright law, it became a
natural candidate for the protection of programs, notwithstanding their inherent functionality.”), 69
(arguing that “protection against piracy” should be the “policy goal of software protection under
copyright”); Samuelson & Scotchmer 2000:1613 (“Copyright law protects programs from the cheapest
and most rapid way to make a directly competing identical product, namely, copying program code
exactly.”).
232

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (principal conditions for patentability); TOEDT 2002:§§ 3.3 - 3.4
(discussion of patentability requirements as applied to computer software).
233

See Copyright Act § 102(a) (extending copyright to “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression”); SCHECHTER & THOMAS 2003:§ 3.1.2 (discussing “minimal creativity”
requirement for copyright protection).
234

For example, DOJ data shows 25 indictments of 73 defendants for criminal copyright
infringement in 2002. http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2002/AppendixC.htm. For similar views
from a former prosecutor, see Levins Interview:1); see also Rubin Interview:2 (similar view from
executive at Microsoft).
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(b) Pre-Market Protection
Copyright also plays a role before a product goes to market, in helping a firm prevent
technology from leaking out through the actions of employees and business partners. The
obvious problem is policing the activity of departing employees. It is common in all startup
sectors – including the software sector – for employees rapidly to move from firm to firm.
Indeed, Ron Gilson argues with considerable force that California rules limiting the ability of
firms to prevent those moves are crucial to the success of the venture-capital industry in Silicon
Valley.235 Yet, it is one thing for employers to allow the cross-pollination of employees and their
human capital and experiences. It is another for their employees to take substantial pieces of
“product” out the door with them and sell that product from their new company.236 As Rob
Merges explains, it surely is optimal for firms to have some control over that activity, and it is
not plain that the parties can protect themselves adequately through contracts alone.237
Thus, although the discussion in the next section evinces considerable skepticism about
the social value of robust trade secret protections, my intuition is that copyright protection serves
an important function. In this context, patent protection is relatively ineffective because of the
litigation costs and uncertainty of such litigation. But in cases in which the employees attempt to
reuse a substantial amount of code from their previous firm,238 copyright law provides a simple
and effective remedy against the new firm.239 The importance of that constraint in the system is
evident from the discussions of corporate counsel about their diligence with respect to new
employees240 and from venture capitalists about their investigation of potential investments. The
only instance in which I heard venture capitalists express concern about preexisting IP of other
firms constraining the ability of their potential portfolio firms is the case in which a startup has
engineers with previous experience designing a similar product, which raises the risk of code

235

See SAXENIAN 1994; Gilson 1999.

236

See infra note 248 (suggesting a distinction between employees departing with patented or
copyrighted technology and employees departing with other forms of trade-secret information).
237

Merges 1999.

238

“We have situations all the time during the course of development where our code walks out
the door. Or we have rogue employees or contractors who have access to the code who leak it.” Rubin
Interview:2; see Beauchamp Interview:9 (suggesting that copyright’s primary value is as “a protection
against possibly disgruntled employees or somebody that may have access to the source code”).
239

The injunctive and criminal remedies discussed above also are important in that context. See
Rubin Interview:2; Witte Interview:5.
240

See Witte Interview::

[T]he way that really happens is when an employee moves from one person to
another person, and takes the code with them. The thing that you are most worried
about is hiring somebody as an engineer to build code, and who in the interest of moving
from Point A to Point B in the most efficient way just borrows some of what they had from
their last employer. * * * * I worry a little bit about somebody taking out, but if you think
about it, if somebody leaves my company and goes to join Microsoft and stuff finds its
way into Microsoft – I’ve won the lottery!

45

46

Software Patents

July 27, 2004 Draft

contamination.241 Although state-law causes of action based on misappropriation of a trade
secret, unfair competition, or breach of employment agreements might remedy some of those
problems, the clarity and simplicity of the copyright action, the ready availability of federal
jurisdiction, and the statutory remedies combine to make it a significant tool in policing such
conduct.
A similar problem occurs for large companies engaged in collaborative development
projects. In that context, the copyright protection that attaches during the development process is
an important part of preserving exclusive rights to the code as it passes among the participants in
the process.242 Although the participants in that process are free to use contracts to define the
rights each of them has in the various portions of the project, the lawyers that participate in that
process argue that the injunctive remedies and statutory damages available under the Copyright
Act play an important role in establishing a robust enforcement backdrop for those
arrangements.243 As one executive explained, “[t]he protection of [a major new product], as it is
being designed, and built, and tested, and being distributed to third parties, is critical. And
anything that diminishes the protection of that pre-release code will impede our ability and
willingness to get outsiders to look at the code and test that.”244
B. Trade Secret
Trade secret protection plainly plays an important role in the software industry, if only
because it is clear that many companies have no formal IP protection for their products245 and
take significant steps to keep the details of their technology secret.246 There are limits, however,
to the extent that trade secret protection can provide a robust appropriability mechanism in the
software industry.

241

One venture capitalist explained:

The only time there is a concern [about copyright] is if you have a team that has
come out of another environment, like Sun, we’re concerned about having a free working
environment up front. If we thought it was encumbered in some way up front, it would be
a problem. * * * *
It is fairly frequent that we’re asking the question: Is there any code at all from
your old employer that is in this. And frankly it is always in the way and there is never a
clean way of doing due diligence in this other than getting to trust the people not to have
walked off with some of this.

Gauer Interview:1.
242

See Rubin Interview:1.

243

See Rubin Interview:1-2 (discussing Copyright Act §§ 502, 504).

244

Rubin Interview:2.

245

In my dataset of software companies that first received venture-backed financing in 1998 and
1999, only 20% of the companies (152/778) had received a patent by the end of 2003. More than half
(51%) of comparable biotech firms had received a patent by the same point in time.
246

See supra notes 225-227 and accompanying text.
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First, as suggested above,247 my interviews strongly suggest that it is easy for competitors
that observe a new product to design and deploy products that include the functionality of that
new product. Such conduct does not violate trade secret law. More broadly, trade secrecy does
nothing to provide the “foothold” protection that is useful for smaller firms trying to fend off
large-firm efforts to market competing products.248 In an industry in which innovation involves
many firms trying to do the similar things at the same time, it is likely that a large firm like IBM
or Microsoft might make the same advance that a small firm has made, even if that large firm has
no access to the small firm’s technology, and thus no responsibility under trade secret law.
Although patents arguably give small firms some shelter in those contests, trade secret law does
not offer the same protection.
Finally, as suggested above, there is some reason to think that vigorous enforcement of
trade secret protections in some contexts – against departing employees, for example – is itself
costly to the industry. Saxenian and Gilson have presented a rich descriptive account arguing
that the development of a rich innovative culture in Silicon Valley depends in part on the free
transmission of noncodified information249 by employees moving from firm to firm.250 Given
the picture of cross-pollinating innovation I describe in this Article, that effect should be
particularly valuable in the software industry.
VI. Alternative Systems
I do not intend to propose a new system for IP protection in the software industry.251
Indeed, our international treaty obligations would make it difficult for us to substitute any such
system for the systems now in place.252 I do think, however, that it is useful to explore in a
summary way the possibility that some reform short of a full-scale abolition of patents might
readily solve the problems that patents cause while leaving in place the benefits they provide.
My discussion is frankly skeptical in tone, reflecting my view that it is difficult to be sure that
any intervention would improve the existing system.

247

See supra notes 220-222 and accompanying text.

248

See supra section III(B)(1).

249

I do not explore the question in detail here, but it seems to me that it is reasonable to draw an
upper limit that cuts off the free transmission of that information at a point where it has been codified into
a patent or specific software code subject to copyright protection. The harms to the firm that loses that
technology seem more serious than when the loss is in the nature of knowledge that the firm has not yet
developed into a specific implementation. In other words, the benefits of free transmission are enhanced
when nothing has been done with information or knowledge, because the likelihood that the new firm will
produce something the first firm has not is enhanced when the first firm has not done anything
sufficiently specific to warrant copyright or patent protection.
250

See SAXENIAN 1994; Gilson 1999.

251

A thoughtful and well-informed group of scholars already has undertaken such a project,
resulting in the justly prominent Software Manifesto, Samuelson, Davis, Kapor & Reichman 1994.
252

See supra note 13.
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A. Registration
The direct benefits of patents necessarily depend on the right of the patentee to exclude
competitors. That is not so clear, however, with respect to the indirect benefits that I discuss. In
particular, the indirect benefits that seem to produce social value253 depend entirely on a range of
information effects that do not require that the information that has been articulated and codified
be deployed to exclude competitors from any particular product they in turn might wish to
deploy. This suggests, in turn, that those benefits could be obtained through a simpler
registration system, in which the technology is registered with a central office that simply
receives the filings but does not evaluate them for novelty or obviousness.254
Although such a system theoretically might provide the indirect benefits discussed above,
while avoiding some of the potential costs, it has a number of obvious problems. First, it would
be difficult to replicate in a less formal process the benefits that come from the information
provided by patents in the current process. For example, the benefits from codification of
knowledge may not depend on an exclusive right to the knowledge, but they do depend on the
insurance that the knowledge has been reduced to a sufficiently precise formulation that it can be
patented. It is not clear how a private office or a simple registration office (like the Copyright
Office) could provide those benefits.
Second, to a lesser degree those benefits depend on the possibility that the patents at
some later date in the development of the technology will have the potential to exclude people
from the technology. I think of the frequent suggestions in interviews that patents are valuable in
making a firm attractive for acquisitions. Although the smaller firm with those patents may not
be using them to exclude the potential acquiring firm from those products, the value to the larger
firm may rest in part on the exclusive potential of those patents.255
Finally, what we know about the behavior of software firms suggests that the
implementation of such a system might face considerable practical difficulties. We know that
firms in the current system strongly resist registering their software with the Copyright Office,
even in circumstances where such registration would facilitate lending (by enhancing the ability
of a lender to obtain an enforceable security interest). As I have discussed, the reticence of
young software firms to disclose their technology makes them reluctant even in the face of the
significant benefits in facilitating financing.256 Here, the costs of disclosure presumably would
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I argue above that the private benefits of cross licensing do not reflect a social benefit: that all
in the industry would be better off avoiding the costs of accumulating those stockpiles.
254

This discussion builds on a conversation with my colleague Oren Bracha. The suggestion
calls for something akin to the German utility model system. See Reeves Bros. v. United States
Laminating Corp., 282 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Bleistein (1937).
255

Of course, the value also may rest in part on the freedom to act those patents provide in the
patent-stockpile scenario. That value, it seems to me, should not be part of this calculus.
256

See Mann 1999.
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be greater than in the Copyright System,257 because the disclosure actually would reveal the
technology.258 On the other hand, the benefits would be considerably less tangible: the ability to
show potential investors that the firm has, and understands that it has, discrete technological
advances.
In sum, the information benefits I discuss above are likely to be so intertwined with the
existing patent system that it would not be practical to design an alternate system that could
disaggregate them from the exclusive rights to technology that characterize the existing system.
B. In Praise of Trolls
The final possibility is some form of compulsory licensing to mitigate the costs of
breakdowns in the licensing equilibrium. As discussed above, a significant portion of the
scenarios in which suits are brought in the industry as it presently exists involve what Mark
Lemley has christened “trolls,” small litigation-oriented firms that exist only to exploit patents,
not to develop products. Because those firms do not develop products of their own, they need
not fear the costs of countersuits by defendants claiming that the products of the troll infringe
patents of the defendant. Thus, the risks of patent litigation for trolls are considerably lower than
they are for the typical operating software firm. A natural response to that analysis would be to
limit the right of trolls to enforce their patents in some way. An obvious possibility would be
compulsory licensing – in which a third party would set a “reasonable” rate at which the patent
must be licensed.
I am dubious that such a proposal could be implemented in a way that unconditionally
would increase incentives to innovate. For one thing, it is difficult to contemplate a proposal that
could define a relevant disfavored class of patent plaintiffs and limit their royalty rights to some
compulsory license fee. Although the suits of “trolls” frustrate many in the industry, any effort
to design a suitable definition of the term “troll” is likely to lend credence to the view that the
status as a “troll” is in the eye of the beholder. Every firm that has a patent that is sufficiently
valuable to support major litigation against a large firm marketing a product that arguably
infringes the patent has acquired that patent from some person that has invested the resources to
invent that technology. It is difficult to discern any principled distinction between the desire of
that inventor to appropriate the value of his invention and the desire of operating firms to
appropriate the value of their inventions.
The fact that the invention may have been assigned by the inventor to a third party does
not suggest that the right to enforce the patent should be diminished.259 To use an example from
my interviews, if Bluecurrent is entitled to retain a law firm to enforce its controversial
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This assumes that the registration system would provide that the information would become
public after a lapse of time parallel to the pre-publication period in the existing patent system.
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In the copyright system, developers resist registration despite rules that allow them to redact
trade secrets and provide only a small sample of code. See Mann 1999.
259

See Maurer & Scotchmer 2004 (discussing a principle of profit neutrality in enforcement of
patent licenses).
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networking patents, why should the right to enforce the patents be dissipated if instead it
transfers the patents to a holding company so that the existence of the patents will not pollute the
firm’s entrepreneurial culture?
In my view, the root of the concern about trolls is not that non-operating firms hold the
patents. It is simply a more fundamental dissatisfaction with the patent system itself. For
example, in the case of Bluecurrent, the popular press has criticized the patents as covering
technology that is so obvious as not to warrant patenting. We have an established process for
resolving that question where parties disagree, and it involves litigation in courts subject to the
supervision of the Federal Circuit. It may be that the Federal Circuit has made standards for
obviousness unduly lax,260 but the solution for that problem – by no means particular to the
software industry – is not to bar enforcement of software patents generally. Rather, the federal
courts should interpret the patent statute more coherently.261
Another source of concern surely is the amount of royalties awarded in suits by trolls,
which in some cases have been immense sums of money. However, that concerns seems to be a
byproduct of the structure of costs and benefits that I discuss above. Despite its fragmentation,
the largest firms in the software industry are quite large by any standard. Thus, a reasonable
royalty on any patent that one of their flagship products infringes is likely to be quite large. It
may be that courts may not calculate those royalties perfectly; the imprecision of the relevant
rules262 makes it almost impossible to imagine what it would mean to calculate those royalties
perfectly. Nevertheless, given the intractability of the questions, there is little reason to think
that an alternate method for compensating trolls for their patents would reflect a more
appropriate return on invention. Rather, it would simply substitute one imprecise scheme for
another, the purpose being to lower the returns available to one particular class of patentholder.
I do not mean to suggest that the existing pattern of litigation in the software industry
evinces a perfect system. I do think, however, that concerns about trolls have been overstated.
Essentially, trolls are serving a function as intermediaries that specialize in litigation to exploit
the value of patents that cannot be exploited effectively by those that have invented them. If that
has any obvious effect, it is to increase the returns to the underlying inventors. In our patent
system, that is not necessarily a bad result.
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There seems to be a consensus to that effect. E.g., Eisenberg 2004 (discussing that problem).
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See Duffy 2002 (suggesting that Supreme Court review on that topic is imminent).
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The problem is that the royalties for an infringed patent are not designed to replicate the
royalties that would be paid in any comparable market transaction. Accordingly, the task of the court
assessing royalties is so hypothetical that neither precision nor effective appellate review can be expected.
E.g., Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Panduit Corp. v.
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978) (per Markey, C.J.). TS Again, to the
extent there is a problem here it is not limited to the software industry or to these particular patentees in
that industry.
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VII. Conclusion
I do not purport to provide a definitive analysis of IP in the software industry. Indeed, I
think that it is impractical to obtain the information that would be necessary to specify the
precise role that IP plays in the industry. My goal is incremental. Specifically, I have attempted
to accomplish two things. The first is to provide a framework to analyze the potential benefits
and costs of patents in the industry. In particular, the delineation of the various indirect effects is
designed to provide a basis for analysis in this and other industries. The second is to sketch the
most important costs and benefits and their relations to each other. Here, the most important
point surely is the differing significance of patents to firms at different stages. Within that
framework, I discern a basic tradeoff, in which the main burden is the net costs of the collection
of patents solely for cross-licensing, and the main benefits are the difficult to quantify benefits of
patents in facilitating the formation of small firms and the licensing benefits (also of unknown
size) to large firms. A full understanding of the import of that tradeoff will come only from a
more developed explanation of the relative import of the contributions of large263 and small firms
to innovation.
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On that point, see Etro 2004 (arguing that monopolists have greater incentives to invest in
R&D than outsider).
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
I use interviews to collect information about the common motivations and understandings
of business practices that are not readily quantifiable. There are of course a number of risks in
relying on interviews. For example, there is the possibility that bias by the interviewer will taint
the results of the interviews.264 That possibility is particularly important in this type of
unfocused research, because the interview scripts are not standardized.265 There also is a
significant risk that the sample of interview subjects will be biased in a way that reduces the
accuracy of the information discovered in the interviews.266 As discussed below, I have done
what seems practicable to minimize those risks. In my view, however, the richness of the
information available from this method far outweighs the methodological concerns.267 The
appropriate response is to proceed with caution in making firm empirical conclusions from the
interviews.
The interviews typically are about 30-45 minutes long. I conducted all of the interviews
personally. As is typical in this kind of research, the interviews were open-ended, without
specifically scripted questions.268 When possible, I conducted the interviews in person, but many
of them were conducted by telephone. When it was possible and acceptable to the subject, I
recorded the interview. If that was not acceptable, I took notes during the interview. Subject to
confidentiality constraints necessary to obtain the interviews, the interview transcripts will be
available on my Web site shortly after publication of this article. All of the subjects are
identified in the opening footnote of the article except where the subjects requested anonymity.
The transcripts include details about the positions that the subjects hold in the companies at
which they are employed.
Because my goal is to understand how intellectual property affects financing practices in
the industry, I attempted to speak to people who invest in startup companies – venture capitalists,
angels, and banks. I also attempted to speak to people at software companies about their
experiences in obtaining funding. I also spoke to people at large software companies to
understand the role of IP in their assessment of potential firms for acquisition and about the role
it plays in funding R&D in their own companies.269 I also attempted to diversify geographically
the interviews by contacting potential interview subjects in several of the states with large groups
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See SEIDMAN 1998:69, 74 (discussing that problem).
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See SEIDMAN 1998:76-77 (discussing why interviewing scripts are inappropriate in this type of
research); see also Bertaux (1981):38-39 (discussing the need for interview “scripts” to “be modified
from one interview to the next * * * according to the progress made in the understanding of [the topic]”).
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See SEIDMAN 1998:44-47 (discussing that problem).

267

See SEIDMAN 1998:5 (discussing the benefits of interviews to collect qualitative information).
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See SEIDMAN 1998:69-70, 76-77.
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II

Software Patents

July 27, 2004 Draft

of software companies and venture capitalists (California, Massachusetts, Texas, Washington,
and Michigan).270
The interview subjects were collected using the “snowball” method.271 As is typical, I
first used any available contacts in the industry from previous research, various institutional
affiliations, and personal connections.272 I also read widely in relevant news sources and
contacted a large number of investors and developers “cold” based on news stories about recent
fundings in the industry. As I interviewed subjects, I also asked for references to other potential
subjects that might be willing to speak to me. As is typical for my work of this sort, I was
successful in getting interviews from about one out of every four people that I contacted. I
discerned no particular pattern in the likelihood that any particular person would agree to an
interview.
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About 60% of software firms that first received venture financing in 1998 and 1999 are
located in those five states.
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See SEIDMAN 1998:47 (discussing that method).
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This methodology is common in these types of inquiries. For example, see Hindle &
Rushworth 2001. For examples of a similar methodology by other legal academics, see Baker 2001;
Bernstein 2001; Bernstein 1996; Bernstein (1992); Black & Coffee 1994, Schlanger 2003.
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